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(16222)

Further Correspondence

respecting

MOROCCO

PART 78

January to December 1941

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING MOROCCO

PART 78.—JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1941

[C 109/109/41] No. 1.

NOTE.—This despatch is circulated as being of interest in showing the mentality of the present Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the aims and ideals of the Spanish Falange party.

Sir S. Hoare to Mr. Eden.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 6.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Madrid telegram No. 11 of the 2nd January, 1941, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Madrid Press Summary of the 2nd January, 1941, respecting an interview given by Señor Suñer to weekly journal *Haz*.

Madrid, January 4, 1941.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Madrid Press Summary, Thursday, January 2, 1941.

SEÑOR SUÑER contributes a lengthy interview on the Tangier question to the weekly journal *Haz* (Arrow-sheaf), the organ of the University Legion of the Falange (S.E.U.). The interview presumably has been conceded to this journal to give it standing and to emphasise the premier position of the young as the moulders and conductors of the policy of the State.

The minister began by saying that when in the month of June of last year a mere "police occupation" of the zone and city of Tangier was conceded to Spain, "we, the young men, the Falange" looked on this affair as something beyond the limits of conventional diplomacy. We had no interest in "policing Tangier," so to speak. What did interest us was to end with the system of international greed for the sake of which the whole artificial internationalism of Tangier had been set up. This system was frankly a constant aggression against Spain. "Those who were not bold enough to snub us or to humiliate us directly, did so indirectly through this veritable farcical show. Thus a thing gained false and solemn airs of legality which was really nothing but an abuse and a piece of arbitrariness." Consequently the "real Spanish political operation" had to be carried out on the first opportunity.

This opportunity presented itself in reality as soon as the war broke out between the countries responsible for the "Tangerine artificiality." Almost all of them, or at least the strongest, were fighting each other. Then the situation took a more complex turn when one of the alliances at war split up as a result of the course of the campaign, and the old Allies separated and accused each other, so that general confusion and peril increased. This situation of increased general peril demanded immediate action by Spain, "both to defend our undeniable rights and to render a great service to Europe." "From the day when England and France declared war on Germany, the city and zone of Tangier became a

wasps' nest. Then Italy's intervention gave more importance logically to this condition of things, and finally the armistice and disappearance of France from the conflict, with the breaking of her alliance with Great Britain, turned the wasps' nest into a centre and core of the gravest risks. By establishing her sole authority there Spain then rendered a service to European interests, the quality and the extent of which no unbiassed person can fail to see.

"The reason I chose the last week of October for definite action was this. I had just taken over the Foreign Ministry. I had gone into the matter with the Caudillo; in fact, the decision was already taken. However, since you ask why a particular day and hour were chosen for the operation, I shall say that perhaps what moved me to proceed with speed, to act urgently, was the really excessive and misled pretension of a certain party.

"This pretension, this claim, was that other forces should share with Spain the defence of the city, of the port and of the Tangerine territory. I attribute this proposal, as I did then, to an erroneous idea of the realities of the European political situation. In no other way can there be any explanation for interference with the action of Spain precisely by those who, whatever may be the final result of the war, can in logic hope for nothing in respect of Tangier. Their claim, in any event, led to the decision being taken to give legal currency to the peseta, and make of it a medium for discharging contracts. It was then, too, that it was decided to make the officer in command of the Shereefian troops of occupation Governor of the city and zone of Tangier. It was then that the international police was disbanded and the Spanish protectorate replaced the previous Administration. We could not permit that the time could come in which Spanish troops might have to line up in Tangier to leave its territory with reversed arms.

"Not only every Spaniard understands our action thoroughly, but every Moor too. Our conduct is inspired by Natural Right. Peoples have natural rights as much as men have. Tangier stands full in the stretch of our geography, our history and our Natural Right. So we are brought to affirm, in a manner which for us is quite conclusive, and should be as conclusive for all, that what Spain has done in Tangier has the character of a natural expansion, based on Natural Right. Reversing the situation, any kindred action by another people would not alone violate the principles of right and the dictates of nature, but in addition would be an act of aggression towards Spain. We should treat it as an aggression pure and simple.

"Turning again to the position of the Moors, they understand perfectly that Spain might have incorporated the city and zone of Tangier in her realm. But to do that would have been to betray the generous character of our foreign policy. It would have been in contradiction with the universal character of Spain's action. For this reason instead of annexation we chose to incorporate city and zone in the Morocco protectorate of his Highness the Shereef. Thus, too, the ridiculous atomisation is being diminished of a people which has a historic, religious and cultural identity which is altogether its own."

The interviewer reverting to the theory of Natural Right, said that it was from its principles, then, that the inspiration of Spanish foreign policy sprang. "Clearly," answered the minister. "Every country follows the route of its particular genius. Some are moved by need of economic expansion, or by the vital space (*Lebensraum*) theory. Others follow the sea routes which are their existence, or pursue the strategic doctrine of the defence of an empire. Those furthest away have a materialist interpretation of history as their guide. I am not going to say which is the best of these now. All I say is that Spain follows the principle of Natural Right."

"It is tied up with the theories of our greatest theologians and tractarians, is in the immortal line of Vitoria and of Suarez, which the Dutch Grotius and his followers afterwards pursued. But there is a marvellous codicil to this, which is that, without the slightest doubt, there exist two categories of humanity whose ideals can only reach their accomplishment within the circle of Natural Right. I mean the Moslem and the Spanish-American worlds. Of one and the other it may be said, though clearly upon different planes, that the two definitely constitute Hispanidad. These peoples of Spanish America and the Moslem communion only find an inspiration for their action and for their policies in Natural Right—that is one of the most profound principles of coincidence they have with Spain. I consider as a great sign of legitimate hopes that the fact that the finest minds of America and of Arabia, such as the Canadian Brown

Scott, the Uruguayan Medina, the Cuban Bustamente, Kiran Bey of Damascus, to mention only these, believe that the foundations of a genuine peace between peoples are only to be found by bringing into force the Spanish principles of Vitoria and of Suarez."

The Minister then came to the question of the attitude of various Powers to Spain's action in Tangier. "The position is clear enough," he said "The peoples who were our friends in the great war of Spain have followed the path which was natural and inevitable for them, and displayed real friendship. As for the others there were the differences you might expect. A certain people, still engaged and very essentially engaged in the war, has adopted an attitude which in a certain way is comprehensive, because for it is doubtless the arguments drawn from our (Natural) right are clear. Its practical nature, too, evidently will have led it to think that the Tangier Babel, the whole international contrivance there, really held no interest for anyone, and in consequence had no interest for European peace.

"Another people, whose military valour did not meet with fortune, has surprised us by reactions which were less comprehensive or understanding." It got into the grips of suspicion and of formalisation, and of useless respect of procedure, brought up arguments based on what was unilateral and what was bilateral, "as though Natural Right was in any degree dependent on contracts, any more than any common inheritance is." All this comes of not understanding the changes which have come over Europe.

"I comprehend that confusion has sprung up in that country in consequence of misfortune, and that this confusion, in its turn, has produced a lack of direction in policy. I believe, however, that this people has had a great opportunity in Tangier for a great friendly gesture to Spain which would have cost it little. The Spanish people is so sensitive, that even though it realised that the gesture was one of little cost it would have appreciated it none the less. Without abandoning anything of its own immediate future, since as far as Tangier is concerned the possibilities of that future are destroyed by the war, it could well have achieved an act to touch the Spanish heart—which is always a good basis for friendliness in common relations."

The interviewer asked had this incomprehension gone on, was it still extant. "Perhaps," replied the minister. "It is probable that a part of the European world has not reached an understanding of what the heroism and the sacrificial desire of our youth stands for. That is what I declared recently to a Vice-President of Council, now out of office. (M. Laval, no doubt.) I told him that the legitimate demands of the youth of Spain, with the impulse behind them of bloodshed and of victory gained, were not to be forgotten. I added, that our youth knew how to fight and to die for ideals of their country's Natural Right, and that it would return to the field again and fight to the death, if that were needed, for the existence and for the dignity of our people. The faith and sacrificial spirit of a youth such as the Spanish is a tremendous political reality, and it has to be seen how far every people can take it into account or not. In any event it must be understood that all this is a thing to be reckoned with, that our youth stands firm and resolved, all who have any youth left in them are resolved to make the last sacrifice rather than have the Natural Right of Spain sabotaged. I speak a plain and understandable language, I hope, for I am no friend of conventionalism. We shall all understand each other better thus than if we enclose ourselves in the formulæ of a diplomacy which facts have put out of court a hundred times over."

[C 1064/212/41] No. 2.

Copy of a Despatch from Mr. Eccles to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 5.)

British Consulate-General,
Tangier, January 27, 1941.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Excellency's despatch No. 5 addressed to Mr. Secretary Eden on the economics of the Tangier Zone. Seen at a distance the nature of the problem appeared relatively simple. Looked at from inside the array of adverse and uncontrollable factors defy accurate analysis and diminish the chances of a successful remedy.

The international régime flourished on the leisure and luxury of a world at peace. When holidays were the rule, and currencies were free, the tourist and the pensioner, the pigsticker and the sunbather, paid tribute to the revenues of an artificial enclave, which produced nothing for export but a few tons of vegetable fibre and a handful of tortoises. In times of war the fruits of idleness have vanished. In their place 4,000 Spanish soldiery batten on the zone, and some 1,500 refugees of different nationalities have left their homes to pass here a frugal and bad-tempered existence. Nothing remains of the former gaiety but the week-end party from Gibraltar, composed of a few dozen military, who, with a courage that does credit to their profession, leave their money, if not their hearts, in the places of pleasure.

2. In the straitened circumstances described above, the inhabitants of Tangier could have tightened their belts, drawn on their financial reserves and survived well enough the consequences of the war. Three factors have intervened to turn a difficult into a disastrous situation. In the first place, the local currency, the Moroccan franc, is being debauched by sales from outside the zone. Secondly, the traditional, and only convenient, source of food, French Morocco, now threatens to cut off supplies, and may shortly have nothing to send, whether willing or not. Thirdly, the Spanish Zone, which entirely surrounds Tangier, is suffering from a famine of all kinds of goods, and sucks out of Tangier, with the strength of a vacuum, the limited and precious supplies which the enclave receives.

3. The Moroccan franc was the only legal currency in Tangier from 1936 until the Spaniards introduced the peseta, as a second medium, a few weeks ago. Up to the time of the French collapse the Moroccan franc, interchangeable with the French franc, was pegged at 176 to £. During last autumn it settled round 250 to £, but since the turn of the year it has been plunging downhill, and is now in the neighbourhood of 400 to £. As reported in Tangier telegram No. 84, this decline is due to sales of French franc notes for hard currencies via the Moroccan franc. The Banque d'État of French Morocco has not yet separated the Moroccan from the Metropolitan franc, although it is clearly in the interests of France to save one of the two currencies, rather than let both become valueless. The Moroccan franc could always command a value. The Bank of France has taken over the reserve of the Banque d'État, but the French protectorate is a rich country, producing largely for export, and was well stocked with goods at the time of the armistice. Faithful to every hint and whisper from enemy-controlled Vichy, the authorities in Rabat are watching with fascinated gaze the ruin of the wealthiest province in the empire.

4. The Tangier black market in exchange deserves a notable place in the history of unhealthy institutions. Behind the counter of every other shop in the main street sits the Jew recording on his blackboard the struggles of a world in decomposition to send help or to run for safety from one barricaded area to another. The profits of this traffic largely compensated for the shrinkage in normal revenues described in paragraph 2. The peseta formed the basis of the market. After the civil war the external value of the Spanish currency was officially held at a level that represented between two and three times its reduced purchasing power in the world at large. Here was a margin to tempt angels: those who had debts to pay in pesetas, or Spanish relations to be helped, or diplomatic missions to maintain in Madrid, exchanged their good coin through the Tangier market. A large part of the pesetas come into the market against contraband sales from Portugal to Spain, and from Tangier and French Morocco to Spanish Morocco. This traffic has grown as the shortage of goods in the Spanish territories has increased relative to the abundance in the neighbouring regions. It is now very large, and provides a greater volume of notes than can easily be absorbed by the offerings of other currencies. It was therefore not difficult for the money-changers of Tangier to maintain the rate of 260 Moroccan francs per 100 pesetas in spite of the rapid decline of the former against hard currencies, due to exceptional pressure from sales of French francs. Nevertheless, at the present rate of 150 to the £, the peseta is beginning to look cheap, and it is to be expected that on any further decline in the Moroccan franc the peseta will be left behind. If the Moroccan franc collapses altogether, the peseta will become the only currency in Tangier. The Spaniards will then be faced with the choice between maintaining the anomaly of a free market in pesetas here or imposing exchange control in uniformity with the rest of Spain.

5. Before examining the prospects for the peseta in Tangier, it is necessary to say a word about the food supply. A table is attached showing the monthly requirements of the zone and the normal sources of supply.(1) French Morocco has always been responsible for the bulk of the food-stuffs. In recent weeks the French authorities have threatened to cut off supplies, as a part of that policy of pin-pricks and reprisals to which a civilised people has descended in their bickerings with the Spaniards. The time may not be distant when the exhaustion of the stocks of French Morocco, expedited with feverish haste in obedience to the demands of Vichy, will render impossible the smallest provision to the neighbouring zones in Africa. It is for us to forestall this event by bringing the French to reason, and so to fulfil the expectations which Tangier and Tetuan have placed in our powers of negotiation.

6. Even if supplies for Tangier could be secured from French Morocco, guarantees against re-export are valueless. A sack of flour, imported from the French Zone at 300 to 400 Moroccan francs, can be sold in Tetuan for 600 pesetas. In the face of such opportunity for profit, no gendarmerie can stop contraband across a frontier drawn by an international pencil. Therefore, the Tangier food supply can only be secured if the famine in the Spanish Zone is relieved at the same time. To what extent the resources of French Morocco could meet the demands of both zones it remains to be seen.

7. If Tangier cannot import from the French Zone, her food supply must be paid for in pesetas or in foreign exchange. Flour from the French Zone costs 3 to 4 Moroccan francs a kilogramme, but if imported from overseas 7 to 8 francs at the present rate of exchange (350 to 400 to £). At this price the Moors, whose average wage is about 10 fr. a day, will starve, as they are starving in parts of the Spanish Zone. The Spanish authorities may try to subsidise bread, but nothing will stop rising prices and increasing distress except immediate supplies of flour and wheat. The problem, it should be observed, will disappear as soon as the production of wheat in Spain returns to normal levels. If the next harvest is good, special help is required for a limited period of six or seven months. I am suggesting, in conjunction with the head of the Economic Department at Tetuan, that special steps should be taken to meet the short-run needs of the Spanish and Tangier Zone. These recommendations were put forward in a tentative way in a letter from me to Señor Calderon, dated the 25th January, a copy of which is attached.(1) Your Excellency will note that in this letter there is no mention of specific quantities or of war trade guarantees. The first point I did not wish to bring up until we knew whether French Morocco (see Tangier telegram No. 119) will continue to supply Tangier. The second is better left for discussion with the High Commissioner, with whom I shall also insist on fair publicity for any assistance given.

I hope your Excellency will consider this interim report as proving the very complex nature of the Tangier problem; later more definite proposals will be submitted for a solution.

I have, &c.
DAVID ECCLES.

(1) Not printed.

[C 2097/13/41] No. 3.

Sir S. Hoare to Mr. Eden.—(*Received March* 4.)

(No. 84.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 22, 1941.

IN my telegram No. 313 of the 21st February, I informed you that the head of the European Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who was a member of the Spanish Delegation in the Tangier negotiations, had at last succeeded in seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs and obtaining his agreement to the solution proposed in my telegram No. 216. I now have the honour to enclose herein a copy of my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 31st December, together with copies, in English and in Spanish,(1) of the memorandum regarding the rights of British subjects mentioned therein, and

(1) Not printed.

copies in translation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply dated the 1st January and of his second communication of the 16th January, regarding the question of fortifications in the Tangier Zone.

2. You will observe that although the Minister for Foreign Affairs had previously categorically refused to alter a word in the memorandum, Mr. Yencken was unexpectedly successful in inducing the Spanish delegate to incorporate the words " the Spanish Zone of Morocco " in paragraph (*a*) 3, and the words " in English, Spanish and French " after the word " published " in paragraph (*c*) 2.

3. Although it had been arranged that the whole matter would be completed at 7 P.M. yesterday evening, it transpired that the Spanish delegate had not succeeded in getting his Spanish copies of the memorandum typed. In order to clinch the matter, however, Mr. Yencken exchanged the notes yesterday and completed the agreement by initialling the memorandum late this afternoon.

4. As you rightly stated in your telegram No. 229 of the 6th February, the agreement thus made is untidy in form, but it became evident early in the negotiations that Sr. Serrano Suñer was not going to accept, if he could help it, anything drafted by the British Delegation, and that the only way to secure any of our desiderata was patiently to insist upon them until the Spanish side produced a draft. The Spanish Delegation, probably on the Minister for Foreign Affairs' instructions, could not be induced to discuss the original draft agreement put up by the British Delegation at the first meeting, and the memorandum as it now stands is a patchwork made up by the Moroccan Secretary-General out of his own notes based upon our desiderata and of Sr. Suñer's redrafts on pieces of paper and backs of envelopes. The only drafting, therefore, that the British Delegation were able to do was my own note to the Minister of the 31st December. Generally speaking, however, it can be said that, taking the agreement reached in conjunction with the assurances given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Commerce and the Secretary-General of the Spanish Zone of Morocco, a great deal more has already been secured than at first seemed possible. The important thing now will be to secure the establishment in practice of a satisfactory *modus vivendi* safeguarding British economic and other interests by means of the measure of co-operation which it has been possible to establish with Spanish officials, here, in Tangier, and in the Spanish Zone of Morocco.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier, whose presence here was invaluable during the negotiations proper, and for whose assistance, local knowledge and good judgment, I am, and the members of the British Delegation also are, extremely grateful.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
A. YENCKEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Sir S. Hoare to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency, *December* 31, 1941.

WITH reference to the attached memorandum regarding the rights and interests of British subjects in the Tangier Zone, which has been agreed and initialled by the British and Spanish delegations, I have the honour to make the following additional observations :—

1. His Majesty's Government have already made it clear to the Spanish Government that they have never regarded the régime in Tangier, or for that matter any other international agreement, as incapable of modification. They have further indicated that so far as they are concerned they are willing to concede that the Spanish Government have a special interest in the Tangier Zone.

His Majesty's Government have already, however, felt bound to place on record a protest at the recent action of the Spanish Government in seeking independently to modify and suspend without notice the institutions of the International régime in Tangier as set up by the convention regarding the statutory organisation of the Tangier Zone of the 18th December, 1923, and by the final protocol of the Conference for the Amendment of the Tangier Statute, signed in Paris on the 25th July, 1928, and to reserve all their rights under these instruments. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government have also made it clear

to the Spanish Government that they are prepared to consider sympathetically any proposals which the Spanish Government may desire to put forward to them and to other parties interested for the purpose of regularising the situation.

2. Your Excellency has already informed me that the Spanish Government have no intention of fortifying the Tangier Zone. I take formal note of this declaration, which I assume covers the construction of military aerodromes. As the Spanish Government have made it clear that the troops maintained there are for the preservation of peace and order in Tangier, it is understood that their number will be kept as low as possible.

3. I further take formal note of your Excellency's declaration that if the Mixed Court should be abolished, the capitulations will be fully and effectively reintroduced and the Consular Court re-established and fully recognised.

4. The present arrangement is understood to be of a provisional nature, pending the clarification of the juridical position of the Tangier Zone, and to be without prejudice to the rights of His Majesty's Government and of third parties under the convention of the 18th December, 1923, and the supplementary agreement of the 25th July, 1928.

I have, &c.
SAMUEL HOARE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Memorandum.

(a) *Personal Rights of British Subjects.*

THEY will be able to enter the Tangier Zone from abroad and able to leave freely as they are at present doing. Freedom of movement in the Tangier Zone. Freedom to work. British subjects may fly the British flag over their residence. They may likewise take tourist photographs.

2. British merchant ships shall be able to enter and leave the Port of Tangier freely, and there will be no hindrance of any kind to British subjects legitimately using the port, or who, on account of their commercial occupations, have to move about within it.

3. Should the Spanish Government suppress the Mixed Tribunal the system of justice based on the treaties in force concerning the Spanish Zone of Morocco will be applied to British subjects.

4. British subjects enjoy the right of inviolability of domicile; in order to carry out a search, the police must first provide themselves with an order issued by the judicial bodies which may be established under the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph.

(b) *Economic Rights.*

The Spanish Government is studying the possibility of the application of a special economic régime for Tangier, on the basis asked for.

(c) *Political Rights.*

1. Compensation for British officials will be made in the following manner : Each official will be paid in pounds sterling three times his total annual emoluments, in addition to the equivalent in pounds sterling of the sum due to him by the Caisse de Prévoyance. The total sum expressed in Moroccan francs will be paid in pounds sterling, conversion being made at the rate of 176 Moroccan francs to the pound sterling. Transfer will be carried out in pounds sterling to the Treasury of the United Kingdom by means of Sub-Account C of the Anglo-Spanish Clearing Agreement of the 18th March, 1940. The Treasury of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the distribution of the pounds sterling to the officials concerned.

2. The following British institutions will continue to function : hospital, post office, cable, church and sporting clubs. The British press will continue to be published in English, Spanish and French, but, like other foreign newspapers, it will be subject to measures of a general nature which will be drawn up by Spain for reasons of police and public order.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir S. Hoare.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Madrid, January* 1, 1941.

IN reply to your note of the 31st December regarding the rights and interests of British subjects in the Zone of Tangier, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Spanish Government, inspired by the desire not to create difficulties concerning the persons or property of the British subjects mentioned, is pleased to accept the initialled memorandum which forms the annex to the note referred to above, and in which are set forth their personal, economic and political rights.

As regards the observations which are contained in the note referred to above, the Spanish Government desires to remind Great Britain of the declarations previously made through your Excellency concerning the nature of the political operation carried out in Tangier, the character of which is, absolutely, the incorporation of the said zone in that of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, already determined by legislative dispositions, the application of which has been begun.

I have pleasure in taking advantage of this opportunity to assure your Excellency of my high consideration.

R. SERRANO SUÑER.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir S. Hoare.

(Translation.)

My distinguished Mr. Ambassador, *Madrid, January* 16, 1941.

ALTHOUGH in our first conversations regarding the incorporation of Tangier in the Zone of the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco, I informed you that Spain would not fortify that place, I wish now to repeat it in more concrete terms by means of this letter.

I remain, &c.

R. SERRANO SUÑER.

[C 2129/109/41] No. 4.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 18, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief record of the events which have taken place in the Tangier Zone during the year 1940. As far as the political situation was concerned, the year can be divided into three distinct parts:—

(*a*) From the 1st January to the 14th June, when the zone lived happily under the international régime without ostensible interference from Spain.

(*b*) From the 14th June, on which day the zone was occupied by Spanish (Khalifian) troops, to the 3rd November.

(*c*) From the 3rd November, when Spain seized the international administrative services and incorporated Tangier into the Spanish Zone of Morocco, to the end of the year.

2. The first six months of 1940 passed without serious incident. Up to the 10th May, when the German troops entered Luxemburg, Holland and Belgium, the war in Europe had not vitally affected the life or commerce of the zone. Supplies were sufficient, and the special machinery devised by the International Administration for dealing with imports and re-exports was adequate. The difficulties experienced during the autumn of 1939 concerning the importation of

food-stuffs, oil, &c., from the French Zone, which has always been Tangier's chief source of supply, had been surmounted, and economic relations with Rabat were maintained smoothly and efficiently.

3. On the 14th June, however, Spain, realising that France was about to collapse, conformed to the habits of the "Axis" Powers by occupying the Tangier Zone with a force of some 4,000 Spanish (Khalifian) troops from Spanish Morocco. This move, which was made without any warning whatever as far as I was concerned, had been previously agreed to by the French Ambassador at Madrid by direction of his Government, which, somewhere in Central France, was fleeing from the German advance into the heart of that country. The occupation was, moreover, tacitly agreed to by His Majesty's Government. This Spanish action proved to be the thin end of the wedge for the future incorporation of the zone into the Spanish Zone of Morocco. Although such an eventuality was fully realised at the time by the Powers concerned, it must be remembered that France was then suffering the greatest disaster of her history, and was therefore powerless to resist the Spanish demand, and that Great Britain, after the events of Dunkirk, was also too fully occupied to take positive action to arrest the encroachment. It should be further noted that at the time of the occupation an assurance was given to the foreign representatives in Tangier by the local Spanish Consul-General that—

> "The military occupation of Tangier and its zone had been carried out by troops of the Shereefian Mahallah in the name of the Sultan with the exclusive object of securing the neutrality of Tangier and its zone,"

and that—

> "The occupation of the zone was of a provisional character, and that all the rights of the interested Powers and established services would be respected."

4. My first warning of the Spanish occupation was received at 7 A.M. from my French colleague, who told me that he had just received a telephone message from Rabat that Spanish forces would occupy Tangier in ten minutes. The ingress of the "protective" troops was effected quietly and did not in itself cause trouble to any of the foreign (non-Spanish) residents of the zone. The Moorish troops were disciplined and courteous to the population, and it was only on one occasion that I was obliged to make representations regarding an incident which occured between the said troops and a British subject. Apprehension, however, grew throughout the summer months that, with the fall of France and the spreading German hegemony over Western Europe, Spain would eventually take the bit between her teeth and either incorporate the Tangier Zone with the Spanish Zone of Morocco or annex it to Spain, thus forcing upon it the same status as Ceuta and Melilla. The British colony of Tangier, numbering some 1,700 (this figure included a large number of evacuees from Gibraltar and other "floating" elements from the south of France and French North Africa), were, rather naturally, prone to considerable nervosity. Rumours were put out by German and Italian *provocateurs* of an imminent and rapid descent by German troops through Spain to North Africa. Spain herself changed her status from that of a "neutral" to that of a "non-belligerent," and from one day to another it seemed that she might assume the status of a full belligerent with dire results to the residents of Tangier. Unlike, however, the French colony, and a large part of the Spanish colony, British subjects maintained for the most part a stoic attitude of "wait and see," and the life of the community was but little changed by such alarmist reports as continued to circulate. This consulate-general did its utmost to reassure British residents and to dissuade them from removing themselves and their property from Tangier. Such persons, however, who had no reason for remaining in Tangier were advised to leave, and a small number of these proceeded to the United Kingdom or to other parts of the sterling area. British "vested" interests in Tangier therefore remained and there was no flight of British capital or other sign that our people had lost their faith in His Majesty's Government's capacity to defend them and their property.

5. On the 3rd November I was summoned at 9 P.M., together with some of my colleagues, by the Spanish Consul-General, who informed us that an order would be posted throughout the town at midnight that night ordaining that the

Committee of Control, the Legislative Assembly and the Mixed Bureau of Information would be abolished forthwith. This was tantamount to the seizure of the control of the Tangier Zone by the Spaniards, and such unilateral action, carried out without any prior consultation with the Powers signatory of the Tangier Conventions of 1923 and 1928, was, of course, completely illegal and in direct contradiction to the assurances mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 3 above. His Majesty's Government and the other Governments signatory to the said conventions (with the exception of the Portuguese and Swedish Governments), immediately lodged protests in Madrid and reserved all their rights. On the 13th November, however, the *Boletín Oficial* of Madrid published a decree incorporating the Tangier Zone into Spanish Protected Africa, and a few days later all the remaining component parts of the Tangier "International" Administration were swept away, the foreign officials (other than those of Spanish and Moroccan nationality) being told to leave their posts immediately. The situation thus created was an extremely difficult one from the point of view of His Majesty's Government. It was of vital strategic importance that Spain should be kept out of the war, and the British strategic value of Tangier (situated as it is on the Straits of Gibraltar), which had previously formed the paramount reason for Great Britain's interest in the zone, was considered of secondary importance and not one such as would make the "Tangier" question an issue of peace or war between Great Britain and Spain. It was therefore decided that, in order to safeguard as far as possible the personal, political, economic and financial interests of the large British colony in Tangier, His Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid should approach the Spanish Government with a view to securing from the latter a written undertaking that all the rights and privileges of British subjects should be preserved, pending a definite agreement concerning the future of the zone, which it was felt could only be reached at the termination of hostilities. It was also hoped that guarantees would be secured regarding the non-fortification of the Tangier Zone and the reintroduction of the capitulatory régime in the event of the future abolition of the International Mixed Court. Finally, it was hoped to secure a promise from the Spaniards that they would consult His Majesty's Government prior to making any further changes in the economic or political status of the zone. A conference between Spanish and British delegates was convened in Madrid on the 24th December, and, while no tangible results had been arrived at by the end of the year, it seemed probable by the 31st December that our requirements would be in large measure satisfied.

6. As regards the economic situation during the year under review, the trade done by Tangier was with French Morocco, Metropolitan France, Portugal, the United States, Great Britain, Spanish Morocco and Italy. Unfortunately, owing to the exigencies of the war, the British authorities were unable to grant all the export licences desired, and transport difficulties also became increasingly severe. Nevertheless, the continuity of the import trade with the United Kingdom was maintained, particularly with regard to piece-goods, motor cars, food-stuffs and pharmaceutical supplies.

7. It is natural that, in an International Zone in time of war, propaganda should be prosecuted by the protagonists of the various belligerents as well as by the belligerents themselves. I decided, in consultation with the Ministry of Information, that the best form which British propaganda might take in so far as Tangier was concerned was straightforward "publicity" of our official standpoint and a wholesale dissemination of official news bulletins, war photographs and sundry periodicals. The *Tangier Gazette*, which had been taken over by His Majesty's Government at the end of 1939, was much developed during 1940 under the able administration of the press attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis. After the stirring world events of the late spring and the consequent abundance of war news items, it was found desirable to publish it daily. and, as there was no evening newspaper in Tangier, Colonel Ellis started a 5 P.M. edition of the *Tangier Gazette* in the French and Spanish languages. So successful was this experiment that the circulation had risen to some 3,100 copies per day by the end of the year. It is hoped during 1941 still further to develop this newspaper and possibly to put out a daily Arabic sheet as well.

8. Although feeling ran high at times in Tangier between the Spaniards and Italians on the one hand, and ourselves on the other, British residents of the port remained, as I stated in paragraph 4 above, calm and united. At the

beginning of the year the Italian colony, flushed no doubt by their initial successes and by the expectation of an early and bloodless victory, behaved towards the British community with the usual lack of courtesy and vulgarity which are endemic in the Latin character when roused. Every effort was made to cast aspersions at the British both by individuals and through the medium of the local Italian organ, *Vedetta di Tangeri*. This culminated in assaults upon the British Post Office and on a large store owned by the British form of Saccone and Speed. Though material damage was done during these "raids," no injuries were inflicted upon individuals.

9. The Spanish community in Tangier was split as regards feeling towards Great Britain. Sincere adherents to the Franco régime remained throughout the year hostile towards England chiefly for two reasons:—

(*a*) An obsession that German "might" must win the war and that a German victory would accrue to the benefit of Spain; and

(*b*) The current belief, sedulously cultivated by the German and Italian agents, that Great Britain had done everything possible to obstruct General Franco's victory during the Spanish civil war.

It is only fair to add, however, that, although the Spanish officials and the "Falangists" in the port were hostile to us, they rarely show this in an ostensible manner, and it was possible all through the year to maintain satisfactory working relations with the Spanish Consulate-General, the Spanish Administrator and the Spanish Governor and his staff. In December, after the Greek successes in Albania and our Libyan victories, a marked change for the better became noticeable in the Spanish attitude of cold aloofness. Another reason for this was that Spain, having secured a bloodless victory over Tangier without any hindrance from Great Britain, was naturally pleased and proud of her local successes.

10. The relations between the French and British colonies of this port (the French number some 4,000) were excellent until France's capitulation in June. Clutching wildly at any passing straws to explain their ignoble defeat, the French then started, on the very day of their armistice, a propaganda campaign against Great Britain accusing her of having been the cause of all France's troubles. Britain had not played her part in the field, on the sea or in the air, and, despite the heroism of the French "poilu," the British "Tommy" had fled the battlefield, and in his haste to save his own skin had not even attempted to rescue his French brothers-in-arms, whom he had left to their fate on the dunes of Dunkirk. The events of Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar added, of course, much fuel to the flame, but I think it is important to remember that the flame was burning brightly before our actual attacks were made on the French fleet and Senegal respectively. The French colony here have, indeed, shown up in their true colours. With but few exceptions, they have followed slavishly the edicts of "Vichy," trembling lest by any outward sign of friendship for England they should be reported by their consulate, and, in the case of State functionaries, either be dismissed or lose their pensions.

11. On the 3rd November an Italian submarine of the "Calve" class put into Tangier at 5 P.M. She had been harried by British destroyers and was pursued by them to the mouth of Tangier Harbour. Again on the 4th November a second submarine of the "Galvani" class arrived also in the evening. Both vessels were placed side by side alongside the wharf, which was closed to all other traffic.

12. The Spanish authorities declared that they would take all precautions necessary in conformity with international law. It should be noted, however, that section 13 of The Hague Convention, which is applicable in this case, was not signed by Spain. This lays down that belligerent warships should, unless they have been so badly damaged as to be incapable of navigation, leave neutral ports within twenty-four hours.

13. Spanish engineers from Cadiz and Ceuta were brought to examine the submarines, and later divers and engineers from Italy arrived in Tangier. They declared them to be so badly damaged as to be incapable of navigation, and proceeded to open up the vessels in leisurely fashion with the assistance of the Spanish authorities. The Italian crews were given accommodation on the Spanish mine-layers *Vulcano* and *Jupiter* and they received hospitality from the Tangier "Falange" organisation, and even from the local Spanish official world. In

short, everything was done by the Spaniards to assist in perfecting the fighting qualities of the craft and in making the visit of the personnel a pleasant one.

14. Despite the assurances given by the Spanish Government to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, the submarines finally escaped from Tangier at about 4 A.M. Greenwich mean time on the night of the 12th–13th December and nothing more was heard of them.

15. My opinion regarding the stay of the submarines at Tangier, as recorded in my despatch to the Foreign Office No. 404 of the 18th December, was as follows :—

(*a*) That neither ship was unseaworthy for the purpose of surface navigation and that the Spaniards should therefore have ordered them out after twenty-four hours, in accordance with international law; and

(*b*) That there existed a complete understanding between the Spanish authorities and the Italians in connexion with the unduly prolonged visit, as was indeed admitted by Señor Suñer, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he stated to Sir Samuel Hoare at Madrid on the 13th December that the submarines needed essential parts "to be of any warlike use" and that it was on this account (not because the craft in question were unseaworthy) that the Italians had asked for a period of grace lasting until the 15th January, 1941.

16. In conclusion, I would venture a word regarding the future prospects of this zone. At the end of the year it seemed likely that the Spanish Government would decide to endeavour to preserve Tangier, and a part of its zone, as a special area of Spanish Morocco which would enjoy free trade and free exchange. But slap-dash manner in which the Spaniards had taken over the administrative organs of the port in December led to such confusion that, on the 31st December, it was not possible for the local authorities to determine their future plans. *Rentiers* of all nationalities (not excluding Spaniards) were, quite naturally, much upset by Madrid's seizure of the zone. Spain has a reputation for bringing misery, disorder and famine in her train, and it was thought that Tangier would be no exception to this rule. Land values dropped and depression settled upon the residents of the port. The one ray of hope for the immediate future seemed to be that some provisional agreement would be arrived at by Great Britain with Spain whereby the latter might agree to the implementation of a régime in Tangier which would provide for free trade and free exchange, and which, further, would give the individual the personal liberty and personal rights to which he had been accustomed under the liberal, but on the whole efficient, International Administration. The British resident colony in particular were indulging in the pleasant expectation that at the conclusion of the war a permanent agreement would be made with Spain whereby the former "international" status of the Tangier Zone would be restored; it being understood that Spain would play a part in the administration which would be commensurate with her interests in this part of North Africa—a part which, as anybody who resided in this zone under the former régime must admit, was not allotted to her owing to the overlordship of Tangier which was exercised by France.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Lisbon, and to His Majesty's Consul, Tetuan.

I have, &c.

A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 2130/109/41] No. 5.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Tangier, February 20, 1941.*

IN my despatch No. 409 of the 16th December I had the honour to report upon the action taken by the local Spanish authorities on the 15th December in dismissing the foreign (non-Spanish) staff of the Tangier International Administration. Although no events of outstanding importance have occurred in Tangier since that date, I think it well, for the purposes of record, to submit to you a brief account of the present political situation here.

2. The Central Administrative services of the Zone of Tangier are now entirely in the hands of the Spaniards. A few Moroccans, who formerly served in the International Administration, have been allowed to remain, as also those Spanish employees who were able to prove that their politics had not been Francophobe during the Spanish civil war. The Mendoub, who administers the native population, and his Moorish staff, the Shereefian customs—the senior officials of which are Frenchmen—and the International Mixed Court are now the only remaining pieces of the former international administrative mechanism of the Tangier Zone.

3. As I have had the honour to explain in my telegrams to your department, my French colleague, the Marquis de Castellane (now *en disponibilité* in France) has been responsible for the maintenance of the Mendoub and the Shereefian customs. The Spaniards have made several futile attempts to dislodge the Mendoub and replace him by a representative of the Khalifa of the Spanish Zone. They have also endeavoured to abolish the Shereefian customs and place that administration in the hands of Spanish officials, but their efforts have proved fruitless and both the Mendoub and the Shereefian officials have refused to be abolished, basing their argument on the fact that, as they are the servants of His Majesty the Sultan, they cannot take any orders except from him. Another interesting point in this connexion is that, according to reliable information received from an excellent source, it seems that the Khalifa of the Spanish Zone has refused to comply with the Spanish demand that he should nominate a "pasha" to take the place of the Mendoub on the grounds that such action would amount to treachery towards his Sovereign. Up till now the Spanish authorities have refrained from using force to turn these officials out of office, and I understand that, being anxious to settle the matter in a peaceful manner, they are now attempting to bring pressure to bear on the Sultan through the French "Vichy" Government with a view to the recall by His Majesty of the Mendoub and the officials of the customs.

4. The International Mixed Court has continued to function in its usual sluggish and ineffectual manner, and I have no reason to suppose that it will be abolished in the near future, although rumours continue to circulate that a Spanish court will be substituted for it in the spring.

5. Concessions given by the former Administration to certain public utility companies (such as the electric light, water, port and bus companies) have with one exception not been interfered with. As regards the port company, however, the Spaniards are reported to be endeavouring to purchase the French shares and thus to gain control. They have also installed an "Interventor," and have tried, but so far unsuccessfully, to dislodge the captain of the port, Captain Maria, who refuses to leave except by force.

6. The Spanish officials from Tetuan, who took over the various departments of the Administration, were not prepared for the tasks which confronted them in the Administration of an international city such as Tangier. Many of these men are career civil servants who have played their part in the administration of Spanish provincial towns in Africa, but they are not suitably trained to take over the control of a port which contains so many foreign interests of various kinds, and which, therefore, cannot be treated in the same way as, for instance, Tetuan, Ceuta or Melilla. Furthermore, much confusion has arisen because of the refusal of the Spanish officials to study the archives of the "International" Administration. The first action taken by these officials on arrival was to clear away all the current archives and start again. "We do not want to have anything to do with the 'International' Administration's methods," one of these said to me, "We mean to start afresh and run this town efficiently on Spanish lines." Lorries were therefore loaded with the "International" Administration's archives, which were dumped in a godown on the outskirts of the town. I hear now, however, that Major Gregori is in such deep water that he has been forced to appeal to the head archivist of the old "International" Administration to salve and sort at any rate some of the discarded dossiers.

7. Another serious difficulty which the new Administration had to meet at the beginning of its task was that of supplies. The French Zone, which is the main source of Tangier's food-stuffs, threatened in December to cut off all consignments, and, although the authorities at Rabat did not carry out their threat, consignments of essential foods such as flour and meat were reduced to such small contingents that the Tangier "War" reserves could not be maintained,

and during the latter part of December flour was for several days non-existent in the port. At the moment of writing the food question has again become easier owing to the resumption of the rations from French Morocco, but Tangier still lives precariously and dangerously in this respect, for it would be possible for the French, if they thought it worth their while, to refuse to continue to send any consignments, thus forcing Tangier to obtain her essentials either from Spain or from overseas.

8. The new Administrator, Major Gregori, unlike the majority of his colleagues, is an intelligent and hard-working man. He has already had experience as head of an administration, having served for some time at Larache (Spanish Zone) as "Interventor." It is possible that he may be able to bring order to the present chaos which prevails in his services, but he has an uphill task and it is too early to predict whether he will be successful.

9. The military occupation of the Tangier Zone, which as you will recall was carried out in June 1940, still obtains, but the number of troops has been reduced and the strength, as far as it can be assessed, now amounts to about 3,000—of these only some 900 are Moorish "Mehallah," the others being Spanish troops from the peninsula. No guns of large calibre have been brought into the Tangier Zone, and some guns of medium calibre which were imported in the autumn have now been removed. While there is no sign of a permanent fortification of the coasts, certain points are closed to the public, and it is reported that trenches and earthworks of other kinds are in process of being made. There is no sign at present of any preparations in the Tangier port for the construction of a naval (submarine) base.

10. The local Spanish officials are, there is no doubt, endeavouring to do what they can to placate hostile criticism on the part of the foreign residents, and the relationship between the Spaniards and the British community has remained on the whole satisfactory. Many of the British residents are, however, quite naturally, extremely dissatisfied with the Spanish administrative methods. An illustration of these methods is the following: the Spaniards are endeavouring to introduce new traffic regulations and parking places in the town without giving the necessary published warning beforehand. Certain British subjects, in ignorance of the changes, have been fined by the police, and I have had to complain to the administrator, not, of course, against the changing of the traffic regulations, but because of the arbitrary manner in which the Spanish police officials are imposing fines upon persons who have not had any opportunity of taking cognisance of the said regulations. A more serious inconvenience lies in the prevalence of petty thefts. Houses have been broken into and several of our nationals living both inside and outside the town have suffered inconvenience. Owing to the difficulties of supplies and the high cost of living, the Moors of Tangier town are experiencing considerable distress, and this is partly responsible for the formation of gangs of marauders, who pilfer freely. I have brought the matter to the attention of Commander Gregori and asked him to take some urgent steps to see that his police control is tightened.

11. An iritating factor is the behaviour of the Spanish port police. Every Monday morning the Bland steamer leaves for Gibraltar, usually with several Free Frenchmen and Allied nationals bound for England or for the other theatres of war. Each time the vessel leaves the port police take it upon themselves to stop these men from boarding the vessel, basing their action on the fact that the persons concerned have not procured either a Spanish "exit visa" or an "exit visa" from their national consulate. I do not recognise either of these requirements, and I have so far been successful in persuading the governor (Colonel Juste) to telephone orders to the police to allow the men on board. I am not sure, however, how long I shall be able to secure satisfaction as in the case of individuals other than British subjects I have, of course, no concrete *locus standi*. This is a matter which may became a serious one if the regulations are definitely enforced by the Spanish authorities, for our traffic in Free Frenchmen will be greatly hampered, if not altogether stopped.

12. On the 6th February (my telegram No. 195 of the 10th February) an "ordonnance," copies in French translation of which I have the honour to enclose(1) for convenience of reference, was signed by the High Commissioner of the Spanish Zone. This ordained that the town of Tangier should benefit from a special commercial and monetary régime, which would include freedom of exchange and

(1) Not printed.

freedom of commerce. While this appears to be satisfactory and to be on all fours with the assurances recently given both by the Spanish Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Commerce, it is too early to forecast the precise effect of the said decree owing to the fact that the detailed regulations called for under certain of its articles have not yet been published. While I have, therefore, no reason to think that it will not turn out to be all that it seems, I hesitate at present to make any forecast regarding its precise effect.

13. In the above paragraphs I have endeavoured to convey the impression that-

(*a*) The normal life of Tangier has not, up till now, been seriously interfered with by the Spanish Administration.

(*b*) The local Spanish authorities, although they are undoubtedly endeavouring to do their best to make their seizure of Tangier a success and to induce foreign residents and foreign vested interests to remain, do not seem either to have the energy or the capacity to deal with the problem on efficient lines.

(*c*) From the naval and military point of view there are no ostensible signs that Spain intends to permit Tangier to be used as a naval base for "Axis" submarines or permanently to fortify the zone. Under the present conditions it is essential to work in with the Spaniards as far as possible, and I am endeavouring to maintain my friendly relations with the local authorities; at the same time I do not propose to let this influence my efforts to preserve for our British community the rights and privileges to which they were entitled under the international treaties. The manner in which Spain will behave in future towards British subjects and their interests in this zone will presumably be dictated by the turn of events on the field of battle.

I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid and to the Governor and Commander-in-chief at Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[Z 1957/132/17] No. 6.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 97.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 4, 1941.

I VENTURE to submit to you a brief report of the political situation and atmosphere obtaining in the French Zone of Morocco as from the 15th July, 1940, the date when Mr. Consul-General Hurst left his post at Rabat, to the end of the year. This report is, I fear, deficient in detail; it only constitutes an attempt to provide a summary, for purposes of record, of the main events, strung together from a vantage point several hundreds of kilometres distant and based upon press reports and upon information received clandestinely mostly from Free French sources. I have, moreover, not had the advantage to meet General Noguès, the Resident-General, or any of the senior staff of the Residency, nor have I been able to visit French Morocco, and thus make myself acquainted with its problems on the spot.

2. The generally admitted tendency of the Frenchman towards individualism seems to have increased since 1914 to the extent of his placing his own interests before those of his country; ample proof of this was provided in French Morocco during the second half of 1940. The majority of the French colonials, I believe, had realised by the end of the year that France's only hope of salvation lay in a British victory, and the majority looked forward in a half-hearted manner to the French Empire re-entering the war on the side of its old Ally. On the other hand there was much hesitation and reluctance to move on the part of the senior officials who were mostly intent upon the preservation, at all costs, of their posts and of the safety of their families. Another important factor in the French psychology was that until September 1940 the greater part of French popular opinion in Morocco seemed genuinely to believe that Great Britain would

lose the war before the end of the year. After France's surrender in June the feeling of the average man in the French Zone (which followed no doubt the Vichy Government's propaganda) was that England would be militarily defeated within a few weeks, and that rather than aggravate the situation by continuing the war in Africa, with depleted and disorganised forces, it would be in France's best interest to placate Germany and thus sow the seeds for a future policy of Franco-German co-operation. Chapter 2 of the French Government's propaganda programme, which was being put about in October 1940 by the French authorities after Hitler's battle of Britain had failed, was on the lines that France might advantageously come back into the war but in her own time, and that it was to her advantage that the belligerents should first exhaust themselves in battle before she stepped in to turn the scale and take the lion's share of the spoils.

3. As seen from here the period under review was noteworthy for the attitude of "indecision" on the part of the officials and the population of the zone. Following upon France's capitulation the feeling of the majority of the French officials and personnel of the armed forces, especially that of the navy, turned against Great Britain, whom they accused of not having supported them adequately in the Low Countries and Northern France or, indeed, in any other theatre of hostilities. It was perhaps excusable for the French inhabitants of a sphere which had not been touched by the privations of war, and who had been educated to believe that complete victory could only be a matter of time, mentally to succumb temporarily to the stunning blows of defeat. A true realisation of the situation did not come to them quickly, and the first natural instinct of many was to find some excuse for the rout. The obvious one at hand was to lay the onus upon their Ally, Great Britain, for all France's troubles, and to attack her with any weapon which might be available. This was, in my opinion, the feeling nurtured by a great number of Frenchmen during the days prior to the naval incident of Oran, after which hostility against Great Britain was fanned to white heat by the French naval authorities at Casablanca, and sanctions were taken against her, whereby His Majesty's consular representatives were withdrawn.

4. His Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat, together with His Majesty's Consul at Casablanca and the British Vice-Consuls at Safi and Mazagan, were requested by the local French authorities to leave French Morocco on the 8th July. In the same way, Mr. Consul (now Mr. Consul-General) Parr, who was permitted to remain at Marrakesh by the French authorities for some three weeks after His Majesty's consular representatives on the coast had left the zone, was, in turn, required by the French authorities, together with His Majesty's Consul at Fez, to leave French territory on the 31st July. The charge of British interests was entrusted to the United States Consulate-General at Casablanca. Mr. Goold, the consul-general, Mr. Stanton, the consul, and the consulate staff were most active in watching over our interests, and I found Messrs. Goold and Stanton particularly helpful in every way. Periodical visits were paid by United States consular officers to our nationals at Fez, Marrakesh, the coastal ports and also Oulmès, where British subjects were interned, and everything possible was done to provide assistance to the substantial British colony in Casablanca. Furthermore, Mr. Goold took all available opportunities to furnish me with political and other information regarding the French Zone.

5. Another sanction taken against us by the French authorities consisted in the immediate expulsion of approximately 13,000 Gibraltarian evacuees who had been sent to French Morocco in May. These unfortunate people were given forty-eight hours in which to leave French territory, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that sufficient sea transport could be made available to take them to Gibraltar, whence they were again evacuated to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, British and Allied shipping lying in the ports of the French Zone (Port Lyautey, Casablanca, Mazagan, Safi, Mogador and Agadir) was detained and remained in French hands until the end of the year, despite various attempts to obtain its release.

6. An extension of the British blockade prescribed for metropolitan France on the 14th July was extended to French North Africa on the 30th July. Unfortunately, however, owing to the severe exingencies of the Royal Navy, it was not possible to implement this efficiently, and ships were continually arriving at Casablanca and other Moroccan ports with produce from Dakar, the Antilles,

North and South America, &c. Freight services were also started from Casablanca to Marseilles via Oran or Algiers, and it was only towards the latter part of the year that some of these vessels were seized in the Straits and taken as prize to Gibraltar.

7. During the period between the incident of Oran and the unsuccessful expedition by General de Gaulle to Dakar in September a certain amount of headway was made by Gaullist propaganda agents to re-educate French opinion. Unfortunately, however, disagreement and jealousy amongst Frenchmen was so rife that it was not possible immediately to set up a central Gaullist organisation, but separate associations of this kind were, I understand, later formed in some towns of the zone. These, however, lacked discipline and guidance, both of which factors are necessary adjuncts to a successful propaganda campaign. Gaullist propaganda and publicity in French Morocco was at first implemented from Tangier, whence leaflets were distributed. This was also carried out, spasmodically, by the authorities at Gibraltar, who arranged during the months of July and August for some dropping of pamphlets from the air on Casablanca and other centres. This culminated in an unfortunate incident in which a British flying-boat was shot down, the two officers being instantly killed and the remaining members of the crew taken prisoner and interned. General de Gaulle's representative in Tangier, who, up to the armistice, had filled the post of military attaché to his consulate-general at this port, came to see me to declare himself on the 18th June, the day of France's capitulation. Since that date he has worked unceasingly for the cause, and he was, I believe, amongst the first to start propaganda in French Morocco by arranging for the production of publicity material, which was sent through safe channels from Tangier to Rabat, Casablanca and other towns in the zone.

8. The incident at Dakar brought forth in French Morocco a new hymn of hate against Great Britain and sanctions were immediately taken by the French, consisting of—

(*a*) Two bombardments of Gibraltar in September.

(*b*) The internment at Oulmès and Settat of some twenty-six of the leading British citizens of Casablanca. There is no doubt that the Gaullist movement, which had made some progress during the summer, suffered a severe set-back by the unfortunate failure of General de Gaulle's action against Senegal. From such information as was available at the time, it seemed possible that, if Senegal had fallen and come over to de Gaulle, the reaction in Morocco against the Vichy Government and Germany would have become so strong as eventually to have forced General Noguès to line up with those Free French colonies already formed. This would, of course, have had an immense effect throughout all French North Africa, and it might, I submit, completely have changed the course of events both in metropolitan France and in Africa.

9. After the Dakar engagement the strictest measures were taken by the officials in the French Zone to combat the Gaullist movement. French "Gestapo" agents were placed in the administrations and a reign of suspicion and hatred ensued which is only comparable to the terror prevailing in totalitarian countries or in the U.S.S.R. Hardly a day passed without some French official being denounced to his chief and forced either to retire on pension or to be dismissed altogether. Such a state of things boded ill for the efficiency of the French colonial régime, and, in particular, for the prestige of France *vis-à-vis* the native (Moorish) population, who were already suffering from the shock and surprise caused by the ignominious defeat of their "protective" Power. Gaullists lost heart, and for several weeks it seemed as if the work which had been carried out, and the progress which had undoubtedly been made, might be permanently lost. Several events of the first importance, however, took place in the late autumn and winter to turn the tide. The failure of Herr Hitler successfully to invade England, the victories of the Greeks in Albania, the British campaign in Libya and, last but not least, the pro-German attitude displayed by M. Laval, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in face of the diminishing opposition of the octogenarian head of State, made an impression upon the French as also upon the native population.

10. At the end of the year it was reliably reported to me that some 80 per cent. of popular opinion were in favour of a continuation of the war, and, of the remaining 20 per cent., only 5 per cent. looked for whole-hearted co-operation with Germany. As regards the official world, almost all the juniors in every branch of the civil administration, army and air force were, by the 31st December, ready to join in with us and resume operations against Germany if only they could have been given a lead. Many of the seniors, however, although perhaps prepared to continue the war, lacked the energy, initiative and courage to declare themselves. As for the personnel of the navy, the vast majority of whom had been anti-British up to October, they also began to appreciate the importance for France of resuming the war, and, although the dislike and jealousy of Great Britain remained, there was a pronounced tendency on the part of many naval officers towards armed opposition to Germany. General Noguès, however, who is an ambitious "political" general, remained "on the hedge," and refused to take any action whatsoever, despite the tentative approaches which were made to him by His Majesty's Government for technical discussions against a day when French North Africa might continue the war.

11. After the fall of France it was thought that General Noguès, the Resident-General, would be replaced by a representative of the French navy as in the cases of Algeria and Tunisia. He was, however, able to steer a middle course and, with the help of Moorish notables and, in particular, with that of the Glaoui of Marrakesh, he remained in office. His staff, however, were changed, and by the 1st October the following new officials had taken up their residence at Rabat as nominees of the Vichy Government :—

Director of Cabinet : M. Hardion.
Civil Cabinet : M. Charpentier.
In charge of mission : M. Mazeyer.
Civil Controllers : MM. Simoneau and Fines.
Military Cabinet : Lieutenant-Colonels Bertrand, Guillou and Chellet, Captain (Aviation) Vienot, Captains de Battisti and Keltani.
Diplomatic Cabinet : MM. Monique, du Gardier and Négrier.
Secretary : Captain Dorange.
Economic Affairs : M. Marchal.

12. The appointment of General Weygand as "Délégué Général du Chef d'État en Afrique" was extremely unwelcome to General Noguès, the Resident-General of Morocco, who, prior to the French collapse, had, in addition, to the post of Resident-General, acted as Commander-in-chief of Troops in French North Africa. General Noguès had, it appears, always been opposed to General Weygand, and he felt particularly bitter towards him because, when he had begged Weygand in June to permit him to continue the war in North Africa, the latter had refused to consider such an eventuality, and had made his decision known to General Noguès in no measured terms after imprisoning the two officers who had been sent to Bordeaux as emissaries from Rabat. Relations, therefore, between Rabat and Algiers (General Weygand's headquarters), were not happy ones, and considerable resentment was shown by General Noguès on the occasion of General Weygand's visits to Morocco and, in particular, by reason of the numerous addresses which the latter made to officers and officials of the protectorate.

13. An armistice commission, composed mostly of Italians but also of some Germans, arrived in French Morocco in July. It appears that the Italians behaved with courtesy and discretion and that no serious complaints were formulated against them. Cursory visits were made by them to the chief centres of French Morocco, but the protectorate was subjected to a lenient control under the Italian régime, and this caused many of the French population to believe that, unlike their unfortunate kinsfolk in metropolitan France, they were to evade the major consequences of their disastrous defeat. Gradually, towards the end of the year, however, the German Reich started to turn its attention to French North Africa and, in particular, to Morocco; and during November and December German officials began to infiltrate into Casablanca and a German port commission was formed there. By the end of the year, however, there was no serious accumulation of Germans, and the Italian commission continued to function in a leisurely, easy-going manner.

14. French Morocco is rich in minerals, cereals, live-stock, fruit and vegetables. It lacks, however, *inter alia*, tea, sugar, and mineral oils, and during the summer much fear was expressed by the authorities lest the tea and sugar supplies should give out and thus cause serious reaction from the native population. Supplies of these commodities, however, were adequately maintained up to the end of the year by spasmodic shipments from the Antilles and the Americas. Oil, on the other hand, was extremely scarce, and in particular petrol and petroleum products. In order to avoid the British blockade controls in the Straits of Gibraltar, many of the Moroccan products, such as wheat, live-stock, &c., were taken by rail via Fez and Oujda to Oran and Algiers, whence they were sent to metropolitan ports. Here again, owing to the lack of naval vessels, it was impossible to stop the traffic and much produce found its way by this channel to unoccupied France and thence, presumably, to Germany and Italy. Reliable reports from Marseilles revealed that the German controls in that port were wont to take anything from 50 to 80 per cent. of the cargoes of incoming vessels and, in the case of fats and oils, it was said that 90 per cent. or more found its way to the Reich.

15. Relations between the French and Spanish Zones became extremely delicate after the fall of France. Concentrations of Spanish troops on the frontier of the Spanish Zone took place in July, and it was thought that Spain would invade French territory and attempt to occupy a northern strip of the French Zone. Various reports were received regarding the Spanish aspirations, and it seemed generally to be admitted that she wished to obtain territory as far south as the line of the Sebou River and running due east to Oujda on the Moroccan–Algerian frontier. But no attack was made, and at the end of the year it was believed that the Spanish Government were intent upon securing satisfaction of their claims by peaceful, rather than by forceful, means.

16. There was much confusion of thought after the French armistice amongst the Moors of French Morocco. The Moorish population before the war were on the whole prone to dislike the French for, *inter alia*, the following reasons :—

(*a*) There is no doubt that the French have exploited the Moors.
(*b*) They have taken the best lands from them and given them to the French *colons*— an act which has naturally caused extreme discontent amongst the Moorish agricultural population.
(*c*) They have failed to provide adequate schools and universities for them.
(*d*) They have interfered in a quasi-religious manner by separating the Berbers from the Mahometan law, and they have supported the elder generation of Moors in maintaining the system of bribery in the native courts.

The French capitulation caused France's prestige with the Moorish population, which was prior to the war fairly high, to fall very low; and the Moors, who before the war and up to the armistice, had been worked upon by German propaganda, turned towards Germany in the hope that she would arrange, at the end of hostilities, for a united and independent Morocco.

17. As regards the Moorish attitude towards Spain, it may be said that, while the Moors dislike them, they are preferred to the French. The Spaniard (mentally) is not unlike the Moor in many respects, and the Moors recognise that the Spaniards have not, on the whole, disturbed the tribes in the possession of their lands—for there has been no influx of Spanish *colons* on a large scale into the Spanish Zone.

18. As regards the Moorish attitude towards Great Britain, there is no doubt that they would be delighted if the British came to Morocco. They have, however, little confidence in us, as in the past we have supported the French. The educated Moor knows what Great Britain has done for Egypt and Iraq, and under what conditions these countries have been given their independence. They know also that we have not interfered in Saudi Arabia—the only mistake which they accuse us of making is that of our handling of Palestine. They would like, of course, to obtain their national liberty, but they mostly realise that this would have to be done by stages, as in the case of Egypt, and they would not be averse to British tutelage—but they do not believe that we should be sufficiently interested to play a leading rôle in Morocco.

19. An interesting figure connected indirectly with the French Zone is that of the Comte de Paris, son of the late Duc de Guise, and one of the heirs to the Throne of France. This engaging young man of some 30 years of age served in the French Foreign Legion in France up to the armistice, when he returned to his home at Larache, a town situated in Spanish Morocco in close proximity to the French-Moroccan frontier. He is in the habit of visiting Rabat frequently, and he has been in close touch with the French authorities there. He also had an interview in the latter part of the year with General Weygand (Marshal Pétain's delegate in French North Africa). The Comte de Paris is biding his time. He is working, of course, towards the restoration of the monarchy, but up to the end of the year he had not publicly declared himself. Whilst not in favour of the "Gaullist" movement, as such, the Comte de Paris was thought to look favourably upon a continuation of the war by the French Empire. He did not, however, take up any position in the matter, preferring to await developments rather than to risk premature action which might—

(*a*) Militate against his future chances of securing the throne, and
(*b*) Cause political complications in North Africa.

I was much impressed with the count, who visited me several times during the latter part of the year. In my opinion, he is intelligent and discreet, and I feel confident that we shall hear more of him in the future.

20. At the turn of the year the future of French Morocco lay in the balance. While, amazing as it may seem, the French *colons* themselves seemed to discard the obvious probability of a future German occupation, such an eventuality seemed only too likely to be in the offing. For the agricultural riches of the country combined with the mineral wealth of the Draa and Souss valleys, the immense importance of the Moroccan ports as submarine and naval bases, the obvious facilities which were afforded all over the country for the construction of military aerodromes, and finally the proximity of French Morocco to the Straits of Gibraltar must surely induce the Germans to occupy such an advantageous portion of the earth's surface, unless those Frenchmen who are in control of France's North African Empire are willing to act while there is still time, and in co-operation with Great Britain make preparations for the defence of some of the most valuable parts of her overseas territory.

21. I am sending a copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid, and to His Majesty's Ambassador, Lisbon.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 2621/109/41] No. 7.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Gascoigne (Tangier).

(No. 248.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1941.

YOUR telegrams No. 387 [of 17th March: Eviction of the Mendoub].

His Majesty's Government have regarded negotiations for the replacement of the Mendoub as the primary concern of the French and Spanish Governments. In normal circumstances His Majesty's Government, as a signatory of the Tangier Convention, would no doubt have been invited to support the representations of the French Government and would have done so, but in present circumstances the French Government must be left to take what action they consider appropriate to safeguard their interests and those of the Sultan of Morocco. For these reasons, His Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid was not instructed to protest to the Spanish Government when he was informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of their intention to replace the Mendoub. (See Madrid telegram 1306 of 1940.)

2. The methods employed by the Spanish authorities are indefensible, but as no direct British interest is involved and there has been no breach of the provisional understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Spanish Government concerning Tangier, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to protest against the Spanish Government's action. The position

is already covered to some extent by the general reservation of the rights of third parties made by His Majesty's Government in concluding the recent arrangement about Tangier.

3. The indirect consequence of the replacement of the Mendoub, namely, the return of the German Consul-General to Tangier, may have serious consequences throughout Morocco and is a most unwelcome development. But there are no good grounds for an effective protest to the Spanish Government.

4. You should establish *de facto* relations with the new Pasha, as you have done with the Spanish administrative authorities in Tangier, and you are also authorised to attend his forthcoming reception.

[C 3381/109/41] No. 8.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 19, 1941.

I HAVE had the honour in my telegrams Nos. 383 and 385 to inform you of the most recent actions taken by the Spaniards in Tangier, viz: (*a*) the forcible expulsion from office of Hadj Mohammed Tazi, the Mendoub, and (*b*) the restoring to Germany of the Mendoubia (the Mendoub's official residence and office). The legal position of these two questions appears to be as follows:—

2.—(*a*) The Mendoub was the Sultan's direct representative in Tangier, and his status and terms of reference were set forth in the Tangier Convention of the 18th December, 1923, article 29. It will be remembered that he was not only the diplomatic representative of the Sultan, but was responsible for the administration of the Moorish population. In fact, he fulfilled all the duties of a pasha, but as Mendoub he was answerable directly to the Sultan himself, and to replace or dismiss him the dahir of the Sultan was necessary. But the Spanish authorities, having without success attempted indirectly for several months, through the French central authorities and the local authorities at Rabat, to persuade His Majesty to give his free consent to the Mendoub's recall, resorted at last to force. Pressure was brought to bear by the High Commissioner at Tetuan on the Khalifa of the Spanish Zone, who is also the direct representative of the Sultan, to issue a dahir expelling the Mendoub and appointing the Cadi of Tangier, Si-el-Arbi Temsamani, to take over Tazi's duties, but with the title of "Pasha" and not that of Mendoub. The significance of this lies in the fact that, as pasha, he will be under the direct orders of the Khalifa and not of the Sultan. As I reported in my telegram No. 383 of the 17th March, the Mendoub himself only surrendered at the cannon's mouth, and he undoubtedly displayed commendable courage and tenacity in clinging to his post until the very last moment. A gun was trained upon his house, and the gun squad, I am reliably informed, were ordered to fire if he did not give in by a certain specified time on the 16th March. Si Ahmed, his son, has also displayed courage. He was offered the post of pasha by the Spaniards some months ago and, in discussing this offer with a French friend, he is reliably stated to have replied "that he would rather serve the last Frenchman than the first Spaniard."

(*b*) The Mendoubia was German property prior to the 1914 war; it had been purchased by the German Government to serve as the German Legation in Tangier. On the 18th August, 1914, the German representative was expelled from Tangier by order of the Makhzen officials of the French Protectorate (Mr. (now Sir Howard) Kennard's despatch No. 227 of the 19th August, 1914), and the German Legation premises, the German post office, &c., were placed under seal during the period of the war and afterwards sequestrated (Treaty of Versailles, article 144), and handed over to the Makhzen. Without referring the matter to the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the Spaniards have now seized the Mendoubia from its lawful owner, the Sultan, and handed it back to the Germans.

3. From the above it seems clear that the actions taken by the Spaniards under (*a*) and (*b*) are devoid of legality, and it was for that reason that in my telegram No. 387, paragraph 2, I had the honour to suggest that, for the purposes

of record, and against a day when at the end of the war such questions will come up for examination, we should register our views with the central Spanish Government.

4. As regards the methods used for carrying out this brutal *coup d'État*, there cannot be the slightest justification. The public ceremonies which were held in connexion with (*a*) the restoring of the Mendoubia to the new German representative and (*b*) the installation of the new pasha have been much criticised locally. During the former ceremony, held in the central square of the town, the High Commissioner of Tetuan addressed a short speech to the German representative in which he explained "that Spain was pleased to restore to the great and friendly nation the building which had been wrested from her in 1914. This constituted one of the first acts that Spain had realised in Tangier since her incorporation of its zone within the Spanish Protectorate, and it was performed with the most sincere pleasure, and as an expression of the warmest friendship which all Spaniards felt for those who had shed blood for Spain in defence of progress and civilisation." In reply, a counsellor of the German Embassy in Madrid, Dr. Stille, made a short speech in German destined chiefly for the ears of his compatriots, substantial numbers of whom had come to Tangier from the Spanish Zone for the occasion. After warmly thanking General Asensio, he ordered, in the name of the Führer, that the German flag should be hoisted. At intervals during the ceremony a *claque*, comprising some twenty Moors, made appropriate noises and gave the Nazi salute when the "Hakenkreuz" flag was hoisted. Their status in the ceremony was clearly revealed, however, when, after it was over, these Moors made a wild rush to the gate of the Mendoubia, where, I learn on reliable authority, they were rewarded by being given 5 fr. each.

5. The second ceremony under (*b*) above consisted of a large afternoon reception held in the pasha's new residence in the native city. The streets were lined by Moorish mehallah and all shops were ordered to close for one hour. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired by the Spanish troops from a piece of waste ground immediately behind this consulate-general, the gun being trained to cause the maximum amount of annoyance to us.

6. In the course of a Hispano-German banquet, which followed in one of the local hotels, more speeches were exchanged on the same lines, and on the following day the German representatives who will now take up their residence in Tangier, together with the German consular officials of the Spanish Zone, were entertained at an official luncheon in Tetuan by General Asensio. In my opinion such public displays by the representatives of a country (even though admittedly it is not "neutral" but "non-belligerent") are provocative, tactless and generally intolerable. The feelings of our colony were naturally running high, and it is to their credit that no unfortunate incident occurred.

7. The reaction to these events upon the native population is interesting to examine. Hadj Mohammed Tazi was not personally popular with the Moorish community—there is no doubt that he was venal and given to favouritism. But the action of the Spaniards in turning out by brute force a representative of the Sultan has been deeply resented by the majority of the local Moors, who naturally feel that their Sovereign has been badly slighted. Furthermore, if Tazi was unpopular, the new pasha seems likely to be more so. The Spaniards have been wise in their choice—they have in Si-el-Arbi Temsamani a man of straw, who, it is safe to predict, will wield no power in the administration of the Moors, but will take his orders from the Spanish Governor of Tangier. A great deal of resentment is, of course, also harboured by Tangier Moors against the French, whom they accuse of not defending their interests, and much contempt is experienced by them for France owing to her attitude of passive acquiescence in the face of this Hispano-German move.

8. As for the European communities in Tangier, they look on in complete disgust, realising that for the present their Governments are not in a position to control Spain's actions. The British community, many of whom have resided in Tangier for years, and who have been greatly comforted by the action of His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid in arriving at a *modus vivendi* agreement with Spain, are once again deeply moved by the advent of a representative of the Reich, and I am receiving enquiries as to whether the time has not now come for them to pack up and repair to some place in the sterling area. I am, of

course, endeavouring to allay their anxieties, and I point to the obvious—that almost all our colonies in Spain and in neutral countries have had to put up with German consular representatives, and the Gestapo which follow in their train. But it will be realised that, with the advent of the German Consul, we may look forward to a period which will be much more difficult than any which we have encountered here up to date. This "minion" of the Reich has presumably come to Tangier, *inter alia*, with the intention of bringing every pressure to bear upon the Spaniards to make things difficult for us, and it is, therefore, in my opinion, all the more essential that our rights prescribed by the Tangier Agreement should be maintained to the letter, and any infringement (or near infringement) of them be contested immediately and with all the strength at our command.

9. As regards myself and my Allied colleagues, no communication of any sort was vouchsafed to us by the Spanish authorities or by the Mendoub or the new pasha. The correct protocol would have been for the Mendoub to have notified us, as he has always done each time he left the Tangier Zone. The pasha should, moreover, have addressed an official letter to the consular representatives announcing his assumption of office. It must, of course, be remembered that we have in Tangier and the Spanish Zone officials of an inferior grade, who know nothing of diplomatic etiquette or even of the ordinary tenets of international relations.

10. It is not easy to assess to what extent the Germans have forced the Spaniards to take their recent action here. From what I gathered when I was in Madrid at the end of last year, the Germans had on several occasions endeavoured to bring Spain into the war on the Axis side. Spain had refused (although it had been a near thing on one or two occasions), and Spain will refuse in the future. But German pressure is growing stronger and Spain has to do all in her power to ward it off by making every possible concession to Berlin in matters of secondary importance. The first action described above under 2 (*a*) happened to be in line with Spain's desires, for with the disappearance of the Mendoub French influence over the Moorish population vanishes entirely. The second, however, under 2 (*b*) is, unless I am entirely at fault, not to her liking, despite the pro-German sympathies of our local Spanish rulers. For it is reasonable to predict that the German Consul and his staff will take this inefficient Spanish administration in hand, and before long they, and not the Spanish, will be the real masters of Tangier. This will not be welcomed by Spain, and it will prove extremely irksome to General Asensio, who is authoritative and vain and does not relish being dictated to.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor, Gibraltar, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon and to His Majesty's Consul, Tetuan.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

P.S.—Since the above was written I have received Madrid telegram to the Foreign Office No. 193 of the 21st March, repeated to me as No. 61. While I realised that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had mentioned to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid on the 20th December, 1940, the replacement of the Mendoub by another Moorish official, this conversation took place some three months ago, and I would submit that it would have been common courtesy, to say the least of it, to warn me before action of this kind was taken. Moreover, Señor Suñer's remark to Sir Samuel Hoare on this subject did not necessarily lead us to suppose that the said change would be brought about in this illegal fashion. If the Mendoub had been removed by a dahir of the Sultan instead of by order of the Khalifa, I should have had no concrete grounds for complaint.

A. G.

March 25, 1941.

[C 4225/919/41] No. 9.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 129.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 31, 1941.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 78 of the 18th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith a brief annual report for 1940 on the main political events in the Spanish Zone of Morocco which has been prepared by His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan.

2. I should like to take this opportunity to mention that Mr. Monypenny has, in the face of considerable difficulties due to the overwhelming German influence in the said zone, succeeded in establishing excellent relations between himself and his staff and the authorities of the Spanish High Commission. General Asensio, the High Commissioner, and his second in command, Señor Figueras, are both Germanophiles of the first order, and the care of British interests and other questions, such as the implementation of British publicity, have, therefore, become problems of great delicacy. Mr. Monypenny has handled these with efficiency and tact, and I am most grateful to him for his loyal co-operation.

3. Copies of this despatch and its enclosure have been forwarded to Madrid, Gibraltar, Lisbon and Tetuan.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Consul Monypenny to Consul-General Gascoigne.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Tetuan, March* 17, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following brief record of events in Spanish Morocco during the year 1940:—

2. The main event of the year was the despatch in June from the Spanish Zone of a force of Khalifian troops to occupy Tangier, and the eventual incorporation, towards the end of the year, of the Tangier enclave into Spanish protected Africa.

3. Otherwise the year was not marked by any local events of outstanding importance, although conditions in the zone were inevitably affected by the war, particularly in the economic field. Throughout the year the authorities found great difficulty in providing food in quantities barely sufficient to meet the needs of a district which, even in normal times, does not produce enough for its own requirements. Already in February the rationing system was introduced, and rationing cards were issued to the public for sugar, potatoes and olive oil.

4. Relations between the Spanish and French Zones—never very good—appeared for a brief moment in February to promise better things, when General Asensio, the Spanish High Commissioner, met General Nogués, the French Resident-General, at Larache. The meeting was stated to be in connexion with a proposed Franco-Spanish commercial agreement. But it was not long before the prevailing uneasiness lest Spain be dragged into the war again caused the Spanish authorities to resume precautionary measures on the zonal frontier, and in March the defence works in the Larache area were fully manned, and the bridges between the two zones were mined.

5. Thereafter, for the next few months, speculation increased regarding the possibility that Spain might be involved in the war. Anxiety was not allayed by increasing signs of military preparations in the zone. The arrival of fresh troops from Spain, the suspension on various occasions of army leave; the taking of a census of men of military age among the Moorish tribesmen; preparations for the distribution to them of rifles and ammunition; these and other measures appeared to confirm the fears that Spanish Morocco would not escape embroilment. There was much talk of Spain's title not only to a considerable portion of French Morocco, but also to Gibraltar. German agents did not fail to take advantage of the situation, and were very active in April and May in spreading rumours of a German-Italian-Spanish rapprochement preparatory to

active collaboration in the war. Finally, in June, excitement reached its culminating point, when, on the collapse of France, rumour was rife that Spanish troops had actually crossed the frontiers into French Morocco. This proved to be incorrect, but public opinion was by now convinced that it was only a matter of days before Spain took steps to recover that part of French Morocco up to the Sebou River, which it was popularly believed belonged to her by right.

6. No move, however, was made against the French Zone. But in the early morning of the 14th June a force of some 4,000 native troops from Spanish Morocco suddenly entered the town and territory of the International Zone of Tangier. Later in the same morning the High Commissioner, General Asensio, informed me that he had taken this action on instructions from his Government, adding that the occupation of Tangier had been undertaken in the general interest to maintain order, and that there would be no interference with the existing civil administration of the town and district.

7. After the first moment of surprise, the occupation of Tangier by Spanish troops caused little excitement in Spanish Morocco.

8. On the 17th June, however, when news was received that the French had sought an armistice from Germany, anti-French demonstrations, organised by Moorish nationalist elements, took place in Tetuan.

9. Axis propaganda now became even more active, and, after the collapse of France, was concentrated against Great Britain. The main theme was that Spain should demand Gibraltar and, if necessary, take it by force. Such propaganda continued throughout the year to enjoy complete freedom from any Spanish governmental restriction. Indeed, the official Spanish Press and Propaganda Bureau at Tetuan was, during the greater part of the year, the main channel for the dissemination of Axis propaganda. A large blackboard exhibited every evening in the bureau's office on the main street, could not have given a more completely pro-German account of events if it had been under direct German control. This blackboard disappeared, however, in the latter part of the year, with the turn in the fortunes of the war, and has not been seen since.

10. The newspaper *España*, which is the most widely read daily paper in this zone, and appears to enjoy a semi-official status, maintained its thoroughly pro-Axis attitude throughout, and German and Italian pamphlets, newspapers and illustrated papers were allowed to be freely distributed or sold in the towns. This was in contrast to the official attitude towards the *Tangier Gazette*—the only local British daily paper—the sale of which was prohibited by the Spanish authorities anywhere in the zone except at the British Post Office in Tetuan.

11. In the field of wireless propaganda, too, the Axis Powers continued to enjoy advantages denied to the British. News, as broadcast from local Spanish stations, was consistently hostile to the democracies, and the overseas news bulletins in Spanish, French and Italian from London were systematically jammed.

12. Nevertheless, British successes towards the end of the year began to have a marked effect on opinion among both Spaniards and Moors, and did much to discredit Axis propaganda. The Italians, in particular, rapidly lost prestige, especially among the Moors. Moreover, it was possible during the year gradually to introduce a certain amount of British propaganda and news into Tetuan through the medium of the British Post Office. British illustrated papers—such as the *Illustrated London News* and the *Sphere* and one or two friendly Portuguese illustrated papers, such as *Si* and *Mundo Grafico*—are both on exhibition and for sale in the Post Office, where also British news bulletins and official war photographs are posted up on notice boards.

13. Although at first reluctant even to enter the British Post Office for fear of incurring the displeasure of the Spanish authorities, the public eventually did not hesitate to do so, and the arrival of the latest editions of the papers and photographs was awaited with much interest by the friendly elements in the population.

14. Towards the end of the year, also, it was possible to arrange for the supply of copies of some of the leading Arabic newspapers and illustrated papers from Egypt. Although these papers arrived late and at irregular intervals, they served a useful purpose in counteracting enemy propaganda among the Moors of Tetuan. Members of the Khalifa's household informed this consulate that they were glad to accept copies not only of the Egyptian papers, but of the English illustrated papers and magazines.

15. Shortage of food-stuffs became more and more pronounced as the year wore on. Rationing was extended to cover most staple articles of diet, and towards the end of the year food queues made their appearance in the towns. Meat, fish, rice, &c., were often unobtainable for days at a time, and the quality of the bread issued to the public gradually deteriorated until at times it was scarcely fit to eat. Reports received from the Rif country and other interior districts indicated that almost famine conditions prevailed among the tribesmen.

16. The local population, however, appears to accept such conditions without undue dismay. Much of Spanish Morocco is agriculturally very poor country, and the tribesmen are accustomed to live near the border line of want. The Spaniards of the towns have become inured to the hardships that follow civil war; the military garrisons in any case receive the best of such provender as is available, and under the existing régime the ordinary civilian public is not in a position to voice its discontent.

17. There were no changes in the personnel of the Administration during 1940. General Carlos Asensio remained High Commissioner throughout the year, and Señor Garcia Figueras retained the post of Secretary-General. There were also no changes in the Army Command. General Miguel Fonte y Manao de Tuñiga, Marques de Noveda, remained Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Morocco, with headquarters at Ceuta.

18. The forces stationed in Spanish Morocco remained substantially the same during the year, except for the addition of one division and a number of small mechanised units comprising a few light tanks and armoured cars. This division—the 41st, known as the Flechas Verdes—arrived from Spain on the 11th August and proceeded to the Larache–Arzila district.

19. Until the outbreak of the European war, the trade of Spanish Morocco had been more and more restricted, by Government control, to barter transactions with Spain and Germany to the exclusion of other markets. As a result, however, of the British blockade, trade with Germany had been very considerably reduced by the end of 1940. So much so, in fact, that the German-Hispano Company known as "Hisma (Limited)," whose turnover amounted to about 20 million pesetas a year, was obliged to close down in September, and German imports into the zone were limited to such light articles as can be transported by parcels post.

20. The elimination of the "Hisma," which enjoyed almost a monopoly of industrial imports and also took in return much of the limited exports of this zone, represented a decided set-back for local German interests.

21. In the absence of alternative markets, it also caused a further shrinkage in the already very restricted trade of the zone.

I have, &c.
R. G. MONYPENNY.

[C 5047/109/41] No. 10.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(*Received May* 13.)

(No. 181.)
Sir, *Tangier, May* 6, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to report upon the political situation obtaining in the Tangier Zone.

2. In my despatch No. 122 of the 24th March I stated that a German consular official and his staff had established themselves in Tangier. Up to the present, while there has been no concrete proof that the Germans are making their pressure felt upon the Spaniards with regard to the administration of this zone, certain straws already show which way the wind is blowing.

3. I learn that the press censorship which was introduced in Tangier recently (my telegram No. 470 of the 9th April) was instituted at the Germans' request for the particular purpose of whittling down the *Tangier Gazette*. You will have seen from my despatch No. 179 how seriously the *Gazette* has been cut by the Spanish censors, whereas the *Vedetta di Tangeri*, the Italian daily newspaper, carries on its offensive abuse of Great Britain in the usual manner and the *Dépêche Marocaine* and *España* are evidently not curbed at all.

4. Generally speaking, the present activities of the Germans, who are still busy consolidating their position, have been devoted to enlisting the services for the propaganda field of the Moors and Moroccan Jews who formerly enjoyed German protection. Furthermore, the Reich Consul is understood to be endeavouring to recruit Austrian, Czech and Polish refugees by promises of full German protection and high financial remuneration if they will assist the fatherland in its hour of need. Threats are no doubt also being made that if the said refugees do not agree to work for the Germans their relations at home will be persecuted or even shot.

5. Rumours which I have heard from various sources tend to show that the German mission here will shortly be substantially increased until it is finally placed under the direction of a diplomatic minister—the plan being that the Tangier representation should constitute Germany's headquarters in Morocco.

6. The reaction upon local foreign (non-British) opinion of our recent difficulties in Greece and Libya has, of course, been a sharp one. The Italians are again coming to the fore, and with the Germans on the prowl in Tangier they feel able to put on a bold front. Some months ago (my telegram No. 881 of the 11th December, 1940) a regulation was made by the Governor of Tangier to the effect that no war photographs or pictures should be displayed in the windows of shops, cafés and other public places in such a way that they could be observed from the street. I gave instructions, therefore, with your assent, that British establishments should refrain from showing these admittedly provocative pictures, and until recently the Italians have done likewise. Now, however, for the past two weeks the Fascio have again brought forth photographs of Italy at war. I have drawn the governor's attention to this, and asked him in a friendly manner to pull the Italians up about it, but nothing has been done, and now that Colonel Yuste is the proud possessor of a high Italian decoration I am not hopeful that anything will be done, although I intend to invite the attention of the new administrator to this matter at the first opportunity.

7. Public opinion in Tangier which, for the first part of the year, had received a sedative in the shape of British victories in Libya, has again become vocal and provocative owing to our set-backs in Greece and North Africa. This is in no way surprising when it is remembered that the majority of local foreign (non-British) opinion here amongst Europeans favours the Axis. British victories, therefore, are received in stony silence by the foreign (non-British) press, while our reverses are hailed with offensive glee by the Axis and Vichy organs. Especially is this notable as regards the Italians, who, although they are led by a reasonable consul-general in the shape of Signor Badoglio (the marshal's son), are much influenced by a disreputable "fascio" which is under the orders of a Roman firebrand who, I am informed, is constantly at loggerheads with Signor Badoglio. Spanish opinion, which on the whole was not displeased with our North African successes (the majority of the Spanish Colony here were adherents of the former Republican régime), is now silent. I do not, of course, refer to the *España* or to the Falange organ *Presente*, which must be written off as Axis instruments. While my Spanish friends are downhearted, they do not despair of our final victory, and they realise, perhaps better than many other foreigners, the absolute necessity for the British campaign in Greece; it is in a matter of honour of this kind that the Spanish show up to advantage. The French remain much as they have always been since last June, and the colony are watching the situation intently. On the whole they seem to hope that we shall be crushed soon, so that peace may be restored to Europe and they may reap the fruits of their Government's pro-German policy. They feel that once Hitler has defeated Great Britain the whole of Germany's wrath will be turned upon us and that France will thereby "wriggle" out of it. But the French of Tangier and French Morocco, who have not felt the horror of the occupation or the miseries of war, cannot be compared, of course, with the population of Metropolitan France.

8. The British colony are, in the majority of cases, behaving with admirable calm in the war of nerves which has been started here by the Germans. There are certain elements, however, who, having nothing to do and being in any case pessimists and busybodies by nature, delight in spreading bloodcurdling rumours, defeatist prophesies and criticism of His Majesty's Government in general and this consulate-general in particular. I and my staff are taking every opporunity to counter the unsatisfactory activities of these individuals who, I am thankful to say, form only a very small minority of the British population.

9. Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon and to the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 6001/13/41] No. 11.

Sir S. Hoare to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 205.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 23, 1941.*

IN my telegram No. 92, addressed to Tangier and repeated to Foreign Office No. 769, I reported the substance of a conversation with General Orgaz on the 22nd May.

2. As soon as I heard of his appointment as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Morocco, I wrote him a letter of congratulations and suggested that we should meet when he came through Madrid. He immediately replied in a friendly letter giving me the date of his arrival, and suggesting a meeting at my convenience. He eventually came to my house that night, where he stayed for an hour and a half, talking in a very free and friendly way of British and Spanish relations in Morocco.

3. Feeling sure that Señor Suñer had kept him in the dark about the Tangier Agreement, I was ready with copies of all the relevant papers and a detailed explanation of the outstanding points. The general told me that he had a short interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that he had been told nothing, either about Spanish policy in Morocco or our agreement. He was, therefore, grateful for any information that I could give him. This interest he showed by reading carefully the documents that I handed him. I then went through them, beginning with the question of the payment of compensation to the displaced British staff. I told the general that there was no dispute upon the amount that had been agreed as long ago as the beginning of the year, and that I could not understand why the payment had not been made long ago. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Instituto de Moneda agreed that the payment was due, but it seemed that some difference of opinion as to whether it should be made from the account of the Moroccan Administration or from some other account in Madrid was holding it up. The general said that he would look into the question at once, and he hoped that Major Gascoigne would put himself in touch with him about it as soon as he reached Morocco. He gave a similar answer over two other outstanding points, the freedom of movement of British subjects and the censorship of the *Tangier Gazette*. As to the movement of British subjects, I pointed out to him the clause in the agreement in which freedom of movement is guaranteed, adding that whilst I could understand that it might be necessary to make restrictions of movement in a military zone, there could be no justification for such restrictions in Tangier, where the Foreign Minister had himself volunteered the statement and put it into writing that there was to be no fortification of the zone. As to the press, I told him that the censorship seemed now to be working better, but that on no account could we submit to anything in the nature of differentiation in the matter between ourselves and the Italians or other countries. He assured me that there should be no differentiation at all. During this part of the conversation I repeatedly emphasised the need for co-operation between the Spanish authorities and the British community on the spot, and for the utmost possible previous consultation, if and when changes in the administration were contemplated. I assured him that he would find in Major Gascoigne a soldier after his own heart, with whom he and his officials could work in a free and frank atmosphere. Such collaboration was essential, not only for the present, but also for the future. Spain demanded expansion in Morocco, and Great Britain had always shown herself sympathetic to Spanish aspirations. It was Great Britain, as Count Romanones himself reminded me, that had brought Spain into the Spanish Zone, and it might well depend upon the friendship of Great Britain whether or not the further aspirations of Spain could be satisfied in the future. If the *modus vivendi* could be made to succeed in Tangier, and Spaniards and British citizens could co-operate together in this provisional period, an atmosphere might well be created that would

greatly facilitate the satisfaction of Spanish claims when the war ended. On the other hand, if relations were bad in Tangier, there would inevitably be prejudice in Great Britain against Spanish claims in North Africa. The general seemed fully to accept these propositions, declaring that, as a soldier, he would see that the agreement was carried out in the letter and in the spirit, and as a Spaniard he wished to see the best possible relations between Spain and Great Britain.

4. As the conversation had developed upon these friendly lines, I thought it a suitable opportunity for warning the general of German machinations among the tribes. It was no doubt easy for the Germans to exploit the economic situation for stirring up discontent amongst the Moors, and it was tempting to Spain to encourage any movement that seemed to favour the unification of all Morocco. None the less, it seemed to me that from the Spanish point of view any such movement was most dangerous. The beneficiary would not be Spain, but Germany. The general answered that it was his wish to keep Spanish Morocco quiet, and that he knew of these German activities and wished to suppress them.

5. I then drew the general's attention to the economic needs of the Spanish Zone. During the protracted negotiations that we had had with the Spanish Government over the import of wheat and other economic questions, Mr. Eccles and I had been constantly impressed with the feeling that Spanish Morocco was not getting its share of the imports that were coming into Spain. Indeed, we had suggested that there should be a special allocation for Spanish Morocco. The Spanish Government had turned down this proposal, on the ground that it was not expedient to differentiate between one part of Spain and another. Whilst we had not, of course, questioned this view, I suggested to the general that he should keep a close eye upon the needs of Spanish Morocco and remember that, so far as Great Britain was concerned, we had shown ourselves most sympathetic towards them.

6. The general is leaving Madrid for Morocco in the immediate future. His plans are to remain there about a fortnight and then to return to Madrid for further discussions. He has promised to see me as soon as he comes back and to resume with me our conversation. I greatly hope that in the meanwhile Major Gascoigne will be able to see him at once, make a close personal contact with him and his staff, and settle on the spot any questions connected with the agreement. I feel that we have in the general a friend who is anxious to work with us, whilst in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Madrid there are only prejudice, ignorance and obstruction on the part of Señor Suñer. If, therefore, the agreement is to work, it must be set and kept in motion in Tangier. The fewer questions that must be referred to Madrid the better it will be for all concerned.

7. I have sent copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon and the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
SAMUEL HOARE.

[C 6909/6909/28] No. 12.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 247. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 1, 1941.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions at Tangier.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier.

Belgium.

M. MARCEL POLAIN, a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Belgian diplomatic service (*à titre temporaire*), assumed his post as Belgian Consul-General at Tangier on the 19th June, 1939.

M. Polain's last post was that of first Belgian representative to General Franco's Government. Previously he served for many years in Japan and Siam. M. Polain seems to be sincerely Anglophile, and he is a friendly and intelligent colleague. Both he and his wife speak excellent English, and Mme. Polain, a native of Ypres, was partly educated in England.

M. Polain has been heavily engaged for over a year with an affair of the heart. The lady in question is of Franco-Portuguese origin and is not "bien vue" in Tangier circles. Much criticism has been levelled at him for the open manner in which he carries on his liaison in this small place, where all personal news is exaggerated and discused with avidity. The Belgian colony are unhappy about the affair, and have threatened, I understand, to complain to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

France.

M. Charles Avond-Froment, French Consul-General since the 28th December, 1936, with the personal rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, was retired on the 9th September, 1940. He was not due to go for another two years, but I gather that he had refused to adopt the policy of submission to Spain which became incumbent upon the French representative in Tangier after the fall of France. He was quite content to depart with his full pension and to leave this distressing task to his successor, M. de Castellane.

M. de Castellane took up his appointment in Tangier as French Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister Plenipotentiary on the 16th September, 1940. He came from London, where he had served as first secretary at the French Embassy. He will be remembered by the Foreign Office in connexion with the evacuation from Great Britain of members of the French armed services and colony after France's capitulation in June 1940, a duty which I understand that he performed to the complete satisfaction of His Majesty's Government and the French Government.

M. de Castellane found in Tangier a humiliating task awaiting him. The French hegemony over the International Zone and France's predominating interests were to be surrendered to Spain. It was to be M. de Castellane's duty to effect this, and, coming as it did immediately after the capitulation of his own country, the burden was by no means a light one.

I conceived a great liking and admiration for M. de Castellane, but unfortunately we were prevented from having close relationship owing (*a*) to the international political situation, and (*b*) because of the suspicions of the local Spanish authorities, which prevented de Castellane from having open communication with me.

On the 2nd February, 1941, de Castellane was withdrawn from Tangier, as I understood it at the time, by the request of the Spanish authorities, who had taken exception to a measure of resistance which he had made to their predatory actions against French interests. To my great regret, he retired to his country seat near Pau, and, although at the time of writing he is still "titulaire du poste," he will not, I fear, return to Morocco.

Mme. de Castellane is a member of the wealthy Paternôtre clan. She is deeply religious, and would in the ordinary course of events have been a great asset to Tangier society.

Since de Castellane's departure the French Consulate has remained in the charge of M. Triat, the consul, who is an amiable but quite ineffective "rond de cuir."

Germany.

German consular representation was resumed in Tangier on the 18th March, 1941. Since August 1914 German interests in the Tangier Zone had been in the hands of the Netherlands Legation. The German Legation had been sequestrated under the Treaty of Versailles and handed over to the Sultan, who had apportioned it as the official residence of the Mendoub, His Majesty's representative in Tangier. At one fell swoop, on the 16th March, the Spanish authorities (*a*) evicted the Mendoub without the authority of the Sultan and (*b*) handed back the Mendoubia to the German Reich.

Herr Herbert Noehring took up his duty as German Consul at Tangier on the 18th March, 1941. I had known him some ten years before when he was second secretary at the German Embassy in Tokyo. I have, of course, had no

intercourse with him since he arrived in Tangier, and I hear that one of the chief clauses of his terms of reference is to inflict as much damage as possible upon British interests. That he will endeavour to do this to the best of his ability I have but little doubt; from what I can remember of him, he had all the perseverance, and capacity for work, of the average Teuton. He is unmarried, but intends, I believe, shortly to indulge in matrimony with a young lady from his own country.

Italy.

*M. Badoglio, Duc de Addis Ababa, the son of the marshal of Italy, took up his duties as Italian Consul-General on the 7th April, 1940, and from that date until the entry of Italy into the war on the 11th June my relations with him were, if not cordial, at least correct. As far as I could tell during this brief period, M. Badoglio seemed more broad-minded than the average Italian diplomat, and he was conciliatory and reasonable.

M. Badoglio is not enamoured of Tangier and complains that it is "too limited" for him and that his colony are difficult. Certainly, the "Fascio" here are strong and independent, and the Italian Consul-General has, therefore, a "rough ride."

The Duchess of Addis Ababa, a good-looking young Italian lady, is quiet and agreeable. She does not, I am told, interest herself in politics. (Written in 1940.)

Although I have only met Badoglio at official ceremonies, I have been grateful to him for the manner in which he has kept his colony in check. On one occasion when he left Tangier for Madrid they instantly took the opportunity to demonstrate against Great Britain by raiding the British Post Office. On his return, I was informed that he gave the colony a severe harangue against this breach of Fascist discipline. Badoglio has not enjoyed good fortune during the war; one of his brothers has been killed and his father, the marshal, has resigned in disgrace.

Netherlands.

*M. F. Gerth van Wijk, Netherlands Consul-General, Tangier, since January 1925, with personal rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Although undoubtedly Germanophile, M. van Wijk has been extremely friendly to me, and I consider that he is an astute colleague. His only daughter was married to Lord Bute's youngest son in July 1939. (Written in 1940.)

I am uncertain as to van Wijk's present political views. He recently recommended to me a Dutch subject for duty in England, who turned out to be a traitor, and he employs a chauffeur who is well known throughout Tangier as being a German agent. Moreover, a representative of the Dutch colony here came to see me some months ago regarding their consul-general's political colour. He warned me against van Wijk and suggested that I should bring the matter to your notice in the hope that you would mention it to the Dutch Government. I hesitate without concrete proof to level such an accusation against a man who, as far as I am concerned, has proved a loyal colleague. But I am watching van Wijk closely and I shall report to you any definite signs of disloyalty which may come to my notice. I am inclined to believe that van Wijk, who is so well known to the German communities in Morocco (having been charged with the care of German interests for some fifteen years), is trimming his sails and will continue to do so until he is convinced that our victory has become a certainty.

Portugal.

*M. de Castro assumed his duties in Tangier as Portuguese Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister Plenipotentiary on the 23rd June, 1940. He came from London, where he served as commercial counsellor to the Portuguese Embassy (and Portuguese Consul-General) for many years. My first impressions are good; he seems to be friendly and Anglophile, and he professes deep regret at leaving London. He served as Portuguese Consul in Liverpool during the major part of the last war. (Written in 1940.)

My second impressions have been even better. M. de Castro and his wife, a French lady, are most favourable to our cause, which they stress vocally on every possible occasion to neutrals and belligerents alike.

Spain.

Dr. Don Manuel Amieva y Escandon, who assumed the duties of Spanish Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister Plenipotentiary on the 1st January, 1940, was replaced on the 15th August, 1940, by Señor Don Carlos Miranda y Quartin, Conde de Casa Real.

Casa Real, who was promoted to be a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Spanish diplomatic service for the purpose, came to Tangier to preside over the last phases of the international régime. From the Spanish standpoint, he carried out this task tactfully and well. He presided over the Committee of Control with exasperating didaction and severity, which, however, my colleagues and I myself had perforce to suffer owing to the difficult international situation. He has a cold exterior and lacks completely the genial characteristics usually found in the average Spaniard. Up to November Casa Real shared with the Governor of Tangier the responsibilities of the Administration (although the International Administration remained, it had but little power). After Tangier's administration had been completely taken over by Spain in December 1940, Casa Real was bereft of his more important functions, and after lingering on in Tangier for several months he was appointed to be Spanish Minister in Cairo in May 1941. This post was given to him over the heads of several other senior officials as a reward for his services to Spain during the period of change in Tangier.

My relations with Casa Real were necessarily strained at times, but, on the whole, I did not dislike him, and towards the end of his time here we became quite good friends.

The countess is a pretty young lady, whose main occupation is bridge. My wife found her pleasant and friendly.

Casa Real left Tangier on the 16th May and the Spanish Consulate was placed in charge of Señor Don Rafael Soriano Muñoz, a first secretary in the Spanish diplomatic service, who holds the local rank of consul. Señor Soriano is not unfriendly, although I learn that he spends much of his time in the society of the local Germans. His wife has not accompanied him to Tangier, as she is in a sanatorium in Spain.

United States.

The Hon. Maxwell Blake, diplomatic agent and consul-general, who had served in Tangier since 1915 with the exception of short periods in Albania and Australia, was replaced on the 7th August, 1940, by Mr. Campbell White.

Mr. White, diplomatic agent and consul-general, came to Tangier from Calcutta, where he had served as United States Consul-General for some six years.

Despite the fact that at our first meeting Mr. White impressed upon me that in his relations with me he must adopt a "strictly neutral attitude," this was by no means carried out. Mr. White spared himself no pains to communicate to me all possible information regarding French Morocco which he was able to obtain through his consular officers in that region. He, moreover, served as a most useful link between myself and the French Consul-General here. I cannot speak too highly of the assistance which I received from this charming American gentleman, who is firmly wedded to our cause, and who, I am sure, would be *persona grata* in any British territory where he might be called to serve in the future.

Mr. White is not a brilliantly clever man, but he displays a large amount of common sense and can certainly be relied upon as regards his loyalty and discretion.

Mrs. White is a sister of Mr. Moffat, the present American Minister at Ottawa. She is a good-looking and typical member of New York society. She was not pleased with Tangier, as its social amenities did not give her sufficient scope.

On the 6th January, 1941, Mr. White was transferred to be United States Minister at Port-au-Prince, Hayti, and the charge of the United States Legation fell to Mr. John Rives Childs, who took over with the rank of chargé d'affaires *ad interim*. Mr. Childs came from the State Department, where he had supervised Moroccan affairs for over four years.

On his arrival here Mr. Childs stated to me that he wished to assist our cause in every possible way, and he has, I think, done his utmost to furnish me with information from the French Zone. Mr. Childs is known amongst some of his United States colleagues as a "desk rat," and he does, in fact, spend an enormous

amount of time with pen and paper. Although he is sometimes prone, in my opinion, to be more academic and theoretical than practical, I admire and like him, and I am sure that he will prove a useful and loyal colleague.

Mr. Childs is married to a Russian lady, a refugee from St. Petersburg. She is very pleasant and has made herelf popular here. She spends most of her time playing bridge.

[C 6912/6912/41] No. 13.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 253.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 1, 1941.*

IT has not, up to now, been the practice to forward to your department from this post a list of local personalities. In view, however, of the temporarily increasing importance of Tangier, I think it well to forward to you herewith a short list of the most noteworthy persons here, which has been compiled by Mr. Vice-Consul Judd.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar, and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Report on the Leading Personalities in the Tangier Zone of Morocco.

Christians.

1. *Amieva y Escandon, Manuel.*—Spaniard, born about 1890. Head of the Spanish Hospital since 1930. Franco's agent in Tangier during the civil war. Consul-general 1940. Administrator 1940. Not anti-British and makes an excellent impression.

2. *Aureoles-Aureoles, Pedro.*—Spaniard, born about 1895. Chief of police. Formerly inspector in Madrid. Fanatical Falangist.

3. *Carleton, Edmundo.*—Spaniard, born about 1885. Illegitimate son of the late Edmund Pius Carleton, His Majesty's consular agent at Alcazar, and a British subject. Head of the Port Police. Said to be pro-British, but has a grievance against His Majesty's Consulate-General, as his claim to British nationality has been disallowed. Intelligent. Disliked by Spanish Republicans, and suspected by Falangists.

4. *Carvajal, Luis Arrieta.*—Spaniard, born about 1895. Colonel. Appointed administrator the 9th April, 1941. Formerly head of the Political Bureau in the Department of Native Affairs at Tetuan. A protégé of General Asensio. Seems disposed to be friendly.

5. *Castro, Fernando de.*—Spaniard, born about 1895. Local head of the Falange. Was at one time attaché to the Spanish Legation here.

6. *Fesser, Adolfo.*—Spanish lawyer, born about 1895. Ran with the hare and hunted with the hounds throughout the civil war. Garrulous and untrustworthy, but able.

7. *Galibert, Paul.*—French judge of the Mixed Court, born in 1877. Member of the French judicial service, who has spent most of his career in Morocco. Sound. Anti-British.

8. *González, Pedro.*—Spaniard, born about 1886, eldest son of the Marqués de Torres Sotos. Head of the sherry firm of González Byass. Very wealthy. Completely pro-British, speaks English perfectly, related to the Gilbey family. Monarchist and anti-Falange. Very well thought of and makes an excellent impression.

9. *Granados, Manuel Tamajon.*—Spanish colonel, born about 1890. Assumed command of the Spanish forces in the Tangier Zone in June 1941. Formerly head of the Frontier Police. Correct and inclined to be friendly, but said to be a light-weight.

10. *Gregori, Gonzalo.*—Spanish infantry major, born about 1893. Interventor at Larache until appointed Administrator of Tangier after the Spanish *coup* of November 1940. Able and respected by his compatriots. A Moroccan expert. Pro-German, but not sufficiently so for the Tetuan authorities, who recalled him to the High Commission in April 1941. Appeared to realise that Tangier could not be administered like a small colonial town.

11. *La Guardia, Angel.*—Spanish Procurator of the Mixed Court, born in 1889. Unimpressive. Member of the Spanish judicial service.

12. *Malmusi, Fernando.*—Italian, born in Tangier about 1890. Judge in the Mixed Court. Speaks Arabic like a Moor and has influence amongst the tribes. Has an American wife.

13. *Ménard, Alfred.*—Born about 1879. A brilliant French lawyer ("ès Lettres") has written a very good book on the legal code of Tangier. Known to be unscrupulous and to have his price. Eccentric in his mode of life and of dressing.

14. *Miguel, Joachim.*—Spanish infantry lieutenant-colonel, born about 1886. Formerly commanded the International Gendarmerie in the Tangier Zone. Declared himself an adherent of General Franco at the outbreak of the civil war, but stuck fast to his post at Tangier. Miguel is very pro-German and he may therefore exert an evil influence on the High Commissioner (General Orgaz), to whom he is now principal assistant. Holds a high German decoration and frequents the society of the local German colony.

15. *Orgaz, Luis Yoldi.*—Spanish lieutenant-general, born about 1885. Assumed charge of his post as High Commissioner in Spanish Morocco on the 23rd May, 1941. Resides in Tetuan, but is likely to loom large on the Tangier horizon. Outwardly friendly and makes a good impression. Has been described as a "café general." Not anti-British and apparently reasonable. A Monarchist and anti-Falangist.

16. *Merry, Díaz Manuel.*—Spanish judge of the Mixed Court, born about 1886. An able lawyer, but given to deciding cases by the light of reason rather than the rule of law, so that many of his decisions are reversed on appeal.

17. *Parladé, Jaime.*—Spanish, born about 1900. Educated at Stonyhurst. Originally an officer in the artillery and later in the International Gendarmerie of the International Zone. Went to Spain on the outbreak of the civil war, in which he participated on the side of General Franco. Is now managing director of the local telephone company, which he runs efficiently. Unprincipled. Affects to be pro-British, but even his Spanish friends regard him as untrustworthy.

18. *Rodière, Yves.*—French Procurator of the Mixed Court, born in 1885. Member of the French judicial service. Able and very hardworking. Has spent most of his career in Morocco.

19. *Sáenz, Basilio Aranaz.*—Spanish, born about 1905. Came to Tangier as deputy chief of police before the international régime was abolished. Now head of municipal services, which have deteriorated since the Spanish occupation of Tangier.

20. *Saurin, Daniel.*—French lawyer, born about 1870. Leader of the local bar and reputed to be a clever lawyer. Not *persona grata* with his own consulate-general, with whom he frequently came in conflict when head of the French delegation to the defunct Legislative Assembly of the International Zone. Quite unprincipled and open to any approach touching his pocket. Anti-British.

21. *Soudan, Joseph.*—Belgian, born in 1874. Judge of the Mixed Court. Member of the Belgian judicial service and formerly judge in the Egyptian Native Court of Appeal. A sound second-rate lawyer who does not appear much in public. Faintly pro-British.

Jews.

1. *Abensur, Aaron.*—British subject, born about 1895. Owns, with his brother Moses (Maurice), the important local banking house of Moses Pariente, established in 1844. Father naturalised in 1896 by special Act of Parliament on account of the family's long services to the Crown. Of undoubted loyalty, he is always ready to help His Majesty's Consulate-General and is a very sound and reliable banker.

2. *Bendrao, Mesod.*—Spanish, born about 1880. Sold arms to both sides in the Spanish civil war and managed to keep well in with the winning side. He is one of the most important of the Tangier importers and he owns a fleet of small schooners which ply between North African and Peninsula ports (including Gibraltar). Keeps his bond when given, but is out to make money in any way he can.

3. *Bengualid, Semtob.*—Moroccan subject, born about 1880. Local head of the firm of Isaac and Joseph Cohen, the principal importers of British goods. Slightly in difficulties of late. Hard worker and highly respected. Jew member of the defunct Legislative Assembly of the International Zone.

4. *Hassan, Joseph.*—Portuguese subject, born about 1880. Very rich and of good repute. Head of the Hassan family, who own the Salvador Hassan Bank. Bank's Tetuan agency acted as Franco's bankers in the civil war, other banks in the Spanish Zone being either foreign and non-interventionist or else controlled by Republican Madrid.

Moslems.

1. *Erkaina, Muhammed.*—Head of the Tangier Habous (religious trusts) administration. Colourless, but his post is probably lucrative and he may therefore be influential.

2. *Erkiousk, Muhammed.*—An "adul" (native lawyer), born about 1887. Able and pleasant. Has been on the pilgrimage and travelled in the Near East, so he probably has a wider outlook than the average Tangier Moor. Slippery.

3. *Erzini, Muhammed.*—British-protected Moor, born about 1880. Wealthy landowner, with some influence amongst the Anjera tribesmen. Garrulous, but pleasant and very loyal.

4. *Ftouh, Muhammed el.*—A lawyer, secretary to the Pasha of Tangier, born about 1905. Formerly scribe to His Majesty's Consulate-General. Pleasant and able, but out for his own ends and not too reliable.

5. *Ghazal, Hamed el.*—Head of the Shereefian Passport Office. A lawyer and hanger-on of the ex-Sultan Abdul Aziz. May have Nationalist leanings, as he is a friend of the Nationalist leader, Abdulhalik Torres.

6. *Hasasi, Muhammed el.*—A qadi (judge). A hanger-on of the ex-Sultan Abdul Aziz. Believed to be efficient, but only recently appointed and comparatively unknown.

7. *Menebhi, si Abderachman.*—Son of the late Sir Mehdi-el-Menebhi, G.C.M.G., and brother-in-law of the redoubtable Pasha of Marrakesh, El Glaoui. Enjoys a certain prestige as the son of his father and on account of his strict observance of the Prophet's precepts. Very loyal, but not very reliable or of strong character.

8. *Tazi, Muhammed.*—Mendoub (Sultan's representative) in Tangier until expelled by the Spaniards in March 1941. Born about 1880. Member of a wealthy and influential Fez family. Aspires to be Grand Vizier at Rabat, and so has adopted a policy of subservience to the French locally. Not so weak as he appears.

9. *Tazi, Hamed.*—Son and formerly assistant to the above. Born about 1900. Capable and speaks French. A candidate for the Pashalic of Mazagan in 1941.

10. *Temsamani, el Arbi.*—Pasha of Tangier, born about 1890. Formerly qadi and promoted pasha on the expulsion of the Mendoub. A puppet of the Spaniards and quite colourless.

[C 7541/109/41] No. 14.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 274.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 1, 1941.*

ONE half of the year 1941 has now passed by, and it may, therefore, be useful if I submit a short appreciation of the situation obtaining in the three zones of Morocco since the 1st January, 1941, until the 30th June.

(A)—*Tangier Zone.*

It will be recalled that the year opened shortly after the Spanish authorities had taken over from the International officials all the administrative organs of the Zone, with the exception of the International Mixed Court and the French (Shereefian) Customs Administration. The economic position throughout January was a difficult one owing to the uncertainty of supplies from the French Zone. The Administration, as such, was in a state of considerable confusion. It may be said that, with the sole exception of Major Gregori, the Administrator, hardly any of the local Spanish authorities were capable of dealing with a situation which called for special treatment and was not, owing to the complexities of the foreign interests involved, comparable with that obtaining in towns of the Spanish Zone. Meanwhile, discussions had been taking place in Madrid between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, which culminated in January in a draft agreement preserving for British subjects the personal, economic and juridical rights which they had enjoyed under the international régime. After much obstruction by Señor Suñer the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the agreement was finally concluded in February.

2. Public opinion in the Zone was distressed, to say the least of it, by the assumption of complete power by the Spaniards over Tangier, and the Moors, who were the chief sufferers under the economic stringency which at first resulted from the Spanish intrusion, were especially discontented and afraid for the future.

3. Although to-day the Spanish Administration of the Tangier Zone shows but little improvement in its methods, it is only fair to record that the foreign (non-Moorish) elements residing in the Zone have suffered and are suffering but little from the transfer of its Government from an "International" to a Spanish Administration. The very pronounced rise in prices which has come about, partly by reason of the depreciation of the Moroccan franc (which, in turn, is due to a variety of reasons not directly connected with the Spanish occupation), has hit the Moorish inhabitants of the town and the rationing of bread for the Moors in the country districts continues to cause hardship. Thanks, however, in great measure, to the economic discussions which took place in Madrid in January between His Majesty's Ambassador and the competent Spanish Ministers, the Spaniards have decided to continue to maintain the special economic and financial régimes in Tangier. Thus, goods coming into the Zone pay the 12½ per cent. customs dues limited by the international treaties and the currencies remain free. Furthermore, an arrangement has been made with the authorities at Rabat for monthly rations of flour, meat, vegetables, fruit, &c., and the provisioning of the Zone continues, therefore, much as before but with reduced rations, especially of flour. Certain restrictions have been placed on the freedom of movement in the outlying coastal districts of the Zone, and new "municipal" taxes, comparable with those in force in the Spanish Zone, are now collected on goods arriving in Tangier. It may be said that these are the only substantial burdens

which have, so far, been placed upon the Tangier population as a whole, and, in a time of war, and with an incompetent Administration, it is remarkable that there has not been severe privation and suffering.

4. In small ways the Spanish authorities are trying to give Tangier the appearance and atmosphere of a Spanish town. The shops have been instructed to display the titles and advertising notices in the Spanish language. The town's traffic control has been altered so as to be on all fours with that obtaining in the Spanish Zone. Even the Tangier *plage* has been affected by the application to the bathing establishments of the Spanish regulations, which forbid males and females to disport themselves in anything but the most "Victorian" bathing costumes. These small items, which, in themselves, are harmless, and which have not, as yet, been enforced with rigidity, have formed the subject of complaints on the part of various members of the British colony, but I have not considered it expedient to take them up with the Administrator; there is no discrimination against British subjects and nobody suffers real inconvenience thereby.

5. Public opinion in Tangier, which swings this way and that, depending on whether the Axis or the Allies are scoring successes in the field, has been vocal but not disturbingly provocative. The censorship of the press, which was imposed by the local Spanish authorities in April, and which, I understand, was introduced at the behest of the Germans to cause inconvenience to our British press organs, is becoming milder as far as we are concerned, in its implementation, following upon the numerous representations which have been made to the responsible authorities both here and in Madrid.

6. Outstanding political events during the past six months have been (*a*) the reinstallation in the "Mendoubia" (the former German Legation) of Reich consular representation; (*b*) the replacing of Major Gregori, the Administrator, by Lieutenant-Colonel Carvaljal, formerly an officer of the Native Bureau at Tetuan, and of Colonel Yuste, Governor of Tangier, by Lieutenant-Colonel Granados, who assumes the post of commander of the troops of occupation; (*c*) the removal under the direct threat of force of the "Mendoub," the Sultan's personal representative in Tangier by a Dahir of the Khalifa of the Spanish Zone, and the appointment of another Moorish official to take his place, but with the title of Pasha. The Pasha, moreover, owes direct allegiance to the Khalifa and not to His Majesty; (*d*) the transfer of the customs services from the hands of the French (Shereefian) authorities to those of the Spanish local officials.

7. Thus, Tangier has passed through the first half of 1941 without serious incident, and, unless Germany decides to extend her European invasion to the peninsula, I see no reason why this satisfactory situation should not continue.

(B)—*Spanish Zone.*

8. The chief event in the Spanish Zone during the period under review has been the arrival at Tetuan of Lieutenant-General Orgaz, formerly Governor of Barcelona, as Spanish High Commissioner and General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid had intimated to me that I could look forward to more friendly relations with General Orgaz than with the former High Commissioner, General Asensio. Asensio was a "Falangiste" of considerable ardour, and a protagonist of Germany. Orgaz is a monarchist and an army general of the old conservative style. He is not enamoured of the "Falange," and if not actually attached to Great Britain, he seems to wish to give us a fair deal. He probably admires German military methods as he is the complete soldier with a 100 per cent. military mind. On the other hand, he is willing to admit that our war effort is by no means negligible. The repercussions which General Orgaz's arrival will have, both upon our interests in the Spanish Zone and also in Tangier, will, I hope, be salutary, and Sir Samuel Hoare has already put before him in certain questions at issue between Great Britain and Spain in Africa, which I am endeavouring to pursue towards a satisfactory conclusion.

9. Moorish politics in this Zone have assumed greater importance and interest during the six months in question owing to the more vocal expression of the nationalist parties' requirements. There are three nationalist parties in the Spanish Zone which merit attention :—

(*a*) Hezb.-el-Ahrar, or Liberal party.
(*b*) Hezb.-el-Islah, or Reformist party.
(*c*) Hezb.-el-Wahada-el-Maghebia, or United Morocco party.

The first of these is now practically extinct, but there are rumours that the Spanish authorities are proposing to restart it in order to combat the pro-German activities of (*b*) and (*c*). The leaders of party (*a*) above mentioned were the Raisuli family; those of (*b*) and (*c*) are Abdelkhalek Torres and Mohamed Mekki Naciri. Another well-known Moor who is identified with party (*c*) is Temsemani, and he works in great measure amongst the hill tribes of the Riff. Torres is undoubtedly in German pay, while Naciri was in Spanish pay, but recently he appears to be moving towards the Germans. Both the Germans and the Spaniards have been urging Torres and Naciri to implement violent anti-French propaganda, and, more recently, Torres has been indulging in anti-British propaganda. Efforts are being made directly by us to influence Naciri in our favour, and this should prove an excellent move if it is not already too late. The Spaniards promise the Moorish nationalists the formation of a united and autonomous Morocco under the leadership of Spain, and Germany is also pushing this, but naturally, the leadership would go to Germany. At the nationalist meetings and in the nationalist press, speeches and articles have been devoted mostly to the abuse of France and of her misdeeds in the past. French hegemony which obtained over Tangier, her misrule in French Morocco and the abuses which she has perpetrated there are also being set forth in the Moorish press.

10. It would be wrong, I submit, to place too much importance on Moorish nationalist opinion. The Moors themselves are not keen politicians, and, excepting for a few of the nationalist leaders, some of whom are sincere but the majority self-seekers, the movement has no real weight throughout the masses. Nevertheless, it must be realised that the Germans, who have worked for years in the fostering of their propaganda throughout Spanish Morocco, have won over the great majority of the younger Moors in that Zone. The Berbers (or hill-men of the Riff) are not, however, so easily seduced by German gold, and they keep a more open mind. Many of the hill tribes are, indeed, said to be friendly to Great Britain.

11. Mr. Monypenny, His Majesty's Consul at Tetuan, who, throughout the first eighteen months of war, during the tenure of office of General Asensio, has had to endure from the Spanish local authorities personal affronts, often of an offensive nature, has succeeded, through his admirable tact and patience, in softening his relations with the local officials. He has always, despite the difficulties, maintained friendly contact with the High Commission, and he now looks forwards, with General Orgaz in the saddle, to an easier period. It is greatly to Mr. Monypenny's credit that he has been able to preserve our interests in the Spanish Zone under these difficult circumstances.

12. Finally, His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid has obtained the permission of the Spanish Government to the appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Melilla. This "Presidio" of Spain, which is some 600 kilom. from Tetuan, is important from a political and economic standpoint. Mr. Richard Croker, a British merchant from Spanish Guinea, who speaks the language admirably, seems to be well suited for the post.

(C)—*French Zone.*

13. As regards the French Zone, the situation during the first six months of 1941 has not materially changed. At the beginning of the year French opinion generally was, by reason of the British successes in Libya, recovering from the disappointments of the Dakar expedition. Later, however, when Libya, the Balkans and Crete fell into the Axis maw, depression again settled upon the inhabitants of the Zone.

14. French officials, from Noguès downwards, have been vocally spreading it about that Great Britain is bound to be defeated by Germany. Although there are certainly some officials in the Administration who remain convinced that France's only hope lies in a British victory, there are, unfortunately, many others who seem to have accepted the path of collaboration with Germany. On the other hand, amongst the younger officers of the armed services (excluding the navy) and the man-in-the-street, there still remains a genuine desire and, indeed, an expectation, that Great Britain will, having lost the first battles, make sure of winning the last. The "rottenness," however, which seems to have entered into the souls of the youth of present-day France, and the corpse-like torpor which prevails amongst the middle-aged who fought, it must be remembered, so brilliantly in the 1914–18 war, precludes any initiative in the absence of a

powerful leader who might galvanise these people into activity. A possible leader is, however, available in the shape of the Comte de Paris, a young man of some 32 years, intelligent and keen, but as yet untried, who might, and I hope will, prove to be the saviour of his country by the proclamation at the right moment of a return to the monarchy. His Majesty's Government have, naturally, not been able to offer the Comte de Paris concrete advice, but they have evinced interest in his work for a restoration which is at present being carried out from a house which he has acquired at Rabat.

15. After long and tortuous conversations between His Majesty's representatives, officials of the United States Government and of the French Vichy Embassy at Washington, a decision was taken in June to furnish French North Africa (including Morocco) with certain essential food-stuffs and commodities. The attitude of Generals Weygand and Noguès remains quite uncertain, but it has been considered expedient to show interest in the French populations of North Africa in a concrete manner in the hope of stiffening them against the ever-increasing German infiltration and thus possibly delaying a complete German strangle-hold over the Zone.

16. The German officials of the Armistice Commission, who have replaced the Italian officials in so far as the latters' functions are concerned, have now reached the figure of some 230. This commission has its headquarters in Casablanca, but its ramifications extend to all the chief centres of the Zone. In addition to the official German Commission there are a considerable number of German "tourists" and German fifth column agents, all of whom are believed to work under the orders of the official commission. The number of this latter category is not known, but reliable rumour has it that there are between 1,000 and 2,000 in French Morocco.

17. As regards British interests, it should be recorded that many of the British subjects who had been detained in concentration camps and in forced residence have been released. At the half-year, the number of British subjects under restraint in the French Zone amounted to nine.

18. As regards the economic situation, there is no doubt that all possible efforts have been made to send the produce of the French Zone—cereals, live-stock, &c.—to Metropolitan France, either direct by sea or over the Oudjda Railway to Algiers. Furthermore, the products of the French overseas territories have come through Casablanca, and many consignments of these have also been forwarded over the Oudjda line for transhipment to France. The Germans are said to be paying particular attention to the mineral deposits in Southern Morocco, a region over which they mean to obtain complete hold.

19. A word should be said regarding the Sultan's position in Morocco. His Majesty's prestige was badly shaken *vis-à-vis* his own subjects by reason of the drastic and illegal action of the Spanish authorities in turning out the Mendoub, his personal representative in Tangier. The forcible eviction from his Tangier office of this Moorish official was described in paragraph 6 above. This blow to the prestige not only of the Sultan but also of the French authorities has caused severe reaction on the Moors, and, in order to counteract this, His Majesty has been undertaking a series of tours throughout the French Zone, the idea being that he should show himself to his people and thus demonstrate to them that his control and that of his "protecting" nation are still to be reckoned with. Whether or not these Royal progressions will have the desired effect can only be judged in the future, but the French authorities are certainly doing their best to advertise them and to give to them that amount of pomp and splendour which is so dear to the Moorish mind.

20. As the war develops, it becomes amply clear that Germany intends to monopolise, and eventually, no doubt, to endeavour to take over completely, the three Zones of Morocco for her own economic, military, naval and air uses. Should the German forces cross the Pyrenees it would seem possible that they may strike simultaneously at Morocco, where the soil is being sedulously cultivated by the Reich. This preparatory work is being carried forward steadily in all the three Zones, according to the usual German technique, and presumably it would be possible, in default of allied intervention, for Germany to seize Morocco by landing a sufficiency of air-borne forces which, with the present German occupants of the country, the German fifth-column organisations and French "collaboration" in French Morocco, could paralyse the chief centres in a comparatively short time. As seen from here (admittedly our outlook is

necessarily limited) it appears, therefore, urgently desirable (*a*) to do everything that is possible to counter the preparations which are being made by the Reich throughout all Morocco, and (*b*) for America and/or ourselves (but preferably for the United States alone) to occupy French Morocco after giving the Spanish Government assurances that their Zone would not be infringed upon unless, of course, it became, as it almost certainly would, a German base for action against the Allies in the French Zone. In order to sweeten the pill for the Spaniards, we might even give them to understand that their claim to the Sebou frontier districts would be sympathetically considered. I most fully realise that, with an unprepared and hesitating United States and with three campaigns of our own in course (not to mention the Atlantic battle and the home front), action of the kind referred to under (*b*) above may not be possible at the present time. But, now that a unique opportunity seems to have presented itself in the shape of the heavy commitments entered upon by the Reich in Eastern Europe, I feel that I should not properly be fulfilling my duties here if I did not invite your attention to the Moroccan picture as it appears to me at the present time. To enable the Allies to seize this chance of beating Germany on the Morocco front there are, in my opinion, three vitally important conditions: (*a*) speed, (*b*) surprise action and (*c*) a force sufficient in numbers and equipment to overcome the extensive and serious resistance which we must expect from the French navy and from other sections of the French armed forces, unless the present French leaders, Generals Weygand and Noguès and Admiral d'Harcourt, could be persuaded to throw in their lot with us and issue the necessary orders to their subordinates to do likewise.

21. Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon and to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 9853/109/41] No. 15.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 347.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 15, 1941.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 274 of the 1st July, I have the honour to submit a brief survey of the trend of the political situation in the three zones of Morocco since that date.

Tangier Zone.

2.—(*a*) During the past two months the political atmosphere in the Tangier Zone has, owing no doubt to the relaxation in the general tension due to Germany's preoccupations in Russia, been quieter than at any time since the Spanish military invasion of the zone in June 1940. The Spanish armed forces, which are now composed mostly of Spanish, as opposed to Moorish, troops, with some native cavalry, have been removed from the immediate precincts of the town itself to the surrounding country, and their behaviour has been such as not to attract attention.

(*b*) Alarmist and exaggerated reports were spread during July regarding the alleged construction of important fortifications on Capes Spartel and Nalabata. According to the information available at present, some gun emplacements have, in fact, been dug in both these localities, but there is no proof that these have been cemented or that they are destined to house guns of larger calibre than those of 105 mm., which are the heaviest pieces to be found at present in this zone. About a fortnight ago the work on these emplacements seemed to have been abandoned, and I am reliably informed that it is not being pursued at the present time.

(*c*) The Spanish Marine Guard, which for nearly a year had proved a thorn in our flesh owing to the activities of its members on the steamer wharf and along the approaches to the harbour, has been removed, as also has the "Comandante de Marina," the Naval Commander in charge of the port. Furthermore, there has been no "stationnaire" in Tangier for some weeks, the only vessel representing the Spanish navy being a small armed launch.

(*d*) I have been moved to approach you recently with regard to the question of the future application of new taxation to British subjects. The Spanish authorities in Tetuan having imposed on Tangier the fiscal régime of the Spanish Zone, many new taxes are being threatened by the local administration. Moreover, the "Interventor," whose coffers are said to be almost empty, is attempting substantially to increase some of the existing "International" Zone taxes. As neither the imposition of new taxes ordained by the Spanish-Khalifian law of Tetuan nor an increase of the existing Tangier taxes can be maintained from the legal standpoint, you authorised me in your telegram No. 580 of the 11th August, 1941, to advise British subjects not to pay any of these new imposts. It remains to be seen whether the Spaniards will, in a concrete manner, attempt to enforce them upon the residents of this zone. If they do, and if payment is refused by British and other foreigners alike, the International Mixed Tribunal, which administers Tangier law, will not be competent to enforce the payment, and the Spanish authorities will then be faced with two courses: either they will have to drop the taxes in question (a practice in which they are adept) or they will abolish the Mixed Court and introduce Spanish-Khalifian law into the Tangier Zone by the institution of a Spanish Court. In the latter case, British subjects will automatically and immediately enjoy extra-territorial rights in consonance with the terms of the "Tangier–Madrid" Agreement of the 31st December, 1940.

(*e*) The most sensational event of an economic nature which has occurred during the period under review was the arrival in Tangier of the British steamship *Pelayo*, coming direct from the United Kingdom (via Gibraltar) with a cargo of green tea and some manufactured goods for Spanish Africa. It would be difficult for anyone not acquainted with Tangier fully to appreciate the surprise and satisfaction which this caused amongst friendly and neutral circles in the zone. Although the visit of this steamer was partly marred by the fact that some of the cargo destined for Tangier was discharged at Gibraltar, the sudden appearance of the British flag on an ocean-going steamer is the best proof which we can give the Moors, Spaniards and neutrals alike of our capacity and determination to bring this war to a successful conclusion.

(*f*) The flow of imports from America into Tangier, which for the first five months of the year were arriving satisfactorily in Spanish bottoms (approximately once a month), has been hampered by the United States order whereby foreign dollar credits in America have been frozen. With the generous assistance, however, of His Majesty's Embassy in Washington this matter seems to have been settled satisfactorily, and substantial stocks of commodities are now on order and will, it is hoped, shortly arrive in Tangier from the States.

Spanish Zone.

3.—(*a*) As regards the Spanish Zone, the only activity worthy of note is the steadily progressive manner in which the military authorities are quietly putting their defences in order and collecting supplies of essential food-stuffs. Upon the arrival of the new High Commissioner, General Orgaz, there was a certain reorganising of the military forces in the Spanish Zone, which, according to reliable information, now amount to some 86,000 regular troops (these do not include labour battalions or native levies), and, this having been completed, there have been no important troop movements or reinforcements to report.

(*b*) As regards military supplies, it has been definitely established that small but regular consignments of munitions and a certain number of guns (two of which are of large calibre—they were reported to me as being 15-inch, but the competent authorities in Gibraltar seem to doubt that they are more than 12-inch) are arriving at Ceuta *ex* Algeciras by the regular ferry service, and at Melilla from Malaga and perhaps other ports in Spain. But these preparations, such as they are, do not savour of an intense mobilisation of military effectives tending towards a future offensive action. The Spaniards are nervous of what is to come, and they wish to be prepared for any eventuality. Their present military activities in Africa are, it would seem, being taken more as a preparation against a future blockade than with an eye to a military adventure against the French Zone. At the same time the situation remains quite fluid in this respect, and he would be rash indeed who made a prophecy regarding Spain's future action in Morocco, which must depend on the course of the present world war.

(*c*) While my personal relations with General Orgaz have been extremely friendly, it is certainly no easier to obtain satisfaction from him than from the ordinary Spanish official or military officer. His charming courtesy and winning smiles do not, unfortunately, lead to the solution of problems. Careful explanations are made to him of what is required; notes are written and memoranda deposited, but little real satisfaction results. He seems to be in considerable awe of Germany and of her local representative's dictates, and he is, I am told, coming more and more to take advice from his Germanophile chief lieutenant, Señor Figueras, the Secretary-General of the High Commission, Colonel Miguel, his military secretary, and Señor Temes, the head of the Diplomatic Cabinet. He is evidently not happy in Spanish Morocco, and sighs for the greater amenities of his former post at Barcelona. At the time of writing, the prevalent rumour, which I have received from a reliable Spanish source, is that the general may leave Tetuan in a few months' time to become Minister of War, and that General Varela, the present War Minister, will take his place in Africa.

French Morocco.

4.—(*a*) I regret that there is nothing substantially satisfactory to report from this area. The information which I gather from my various informants is, in the main, identic. The feeling of the people remains statically bad, owing, chiefly, to the "collaborationist" tendencies of their leaders, to the Vichy–Axis press and radio and to local German propaganda. The German commission in Casablanca, which now numbers some 200 members, has, since the Russian campaign, maintained more outward reserve than formerly, and General Schulteiss, its leader, is reported to have told General Noguès, the French Resident-General, that he would not indulge in propaganda, and that the commission would keep strictly to the duties laid down by the Armistice Convention. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the German commissioners were adhering to this admirable intention. I understand that their propaganda and Fifth Column activities are going forward with increasing energy in all parts of the zone.

(*b*) The agreement arrived at between Great Britain, America and France in June, for furnishing French North Africa with limited supplies, is being implemented, and I am informed that up to date the following ships, the *Ile de Ouessant*, the *Ile de Noirmoutir* and one tanker, the *Scheherazade*, have arrived at Casablanca with commodities and oil. At the same time some thirteen American "observers" have been stationed at points in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, ostensibly to supervise the distribution of these supplies. Their main preoccupation, however, is to secure information and generally to travel round and show the flag as much as possible. My United States colleague tells me that the effect on the French population of the arrival of these supplies has been very salutary, and has already served to stimulate the morale of the Arabs. Furthermore, I have just received a report from a very reliable Moroccan subject living in Mazagan that the Arabs are realising more and more that Great Britain plays a large part in the supply scheme. On the other hand, one of the United States "observers" recently told me how disappointed he and his colleagues have felt because of the "ingratitude" of the local French officials, who, fearing no doubt German reprisals, had refused to permit the arrival of the goods to be adequately announced in the local press. In any case, the main object which, as I understand it, we had in view with regard to these supplies was to "involve" America in these African districts of the war zone, and this has certainly been achieved. In addition to the activities of the United States "observers," the American Legation at Tangier, which, a few months ago, was a "sleepy" concern, has increased its staff, and is now taking the keenest interest in Moroccan affairs. What is more, my American colleague has urged his Government to undertake some publicity and propaganda in Morocco, and I have promised to arrange for the press attaché to this consulate-general to assist Mr. Childs as much as possible in the carrying out of this most necessary work.

5. Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon, and to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

[C 11854/109/41] No. 16.

Consul-General Gascoigne to Mr. Eden.—(*Received October* 27.)

(No. 431.)
Sir, *Tangier, October* 20, 1941.

ON my return from the United Kingdom I have the honour to submit a report on the present situation in the Tangier Zone.

2. During September and the first half of October the general financial and economic situations in this zone have gravely deteriorated. Whereas the economic position here was, up to the beginning of September, a fairly satisfactory one in that, while prices were continuing to rise owing, *inter alia*, to the loss of the purchasing power of the Moroccan franc, supplies to Tangier were fairly adequate, although it must be remembered that the Moors have for many months suffered from high prices and the uneven distribution of food-stuffs. At the present time, however, the economic position obtaining in Tangier is serious, as you will observe from the memorandum prepared by Mr. Vice-Consul Judd, copy of which I have the honour to enclose. The fundamental causes, I think, of this unsatisfactory state of things are the venality and incompetence of the Spanish Administration, but there is no doubt that a great part of the materials arriving in Tangier, which are paid for by, and destined for, this zone, are commandeered by order of the Spanish military authorities at Tetuan and find their way into the Spanish Zone either for the specific use of the military or for other purposes.

3. I have had the honour to inform you in my telegrams Nos. 923 and 930 of the 15th and the 18th October, respectively, of the attitude of (*a*) my Spanish colleague here, and (*b*) the Spanish High Commissioner, towards the present situation in Tangier, and I am at present awaiting some sign that General Orgaz is really intent upon taking the matter in hand by recasting the present administrative machinery in Tangier and preventing the flight of our supplies to alien destinations. In this connexion I should add that I have been approached by Mr. Maxwell Blake, until fairly recently United States Minister in Tangier, who, after more than twenty years' experience of North Africa, is in personal touch with a great number of the local Spanish notables, as to whether I and some of our merchants would be willing to meet General Orgaz and his lieutenants in an unofficial conclave at Mr. Blake's house, the object of this being for us to have a frank discussion about the present situation in Tangier and to exchange views regarding the best means of finding a cure. I should add that the move was suggested to Mr. Blake by a senior Spanish official of Tetuan, presumably under the direction of General Orgaz. Mr. Blake has also approached my American colleague on this subject, but Mr. Childs will have nothing to do with it, partly, I think, from personal reasons—the new broom often comes into conflict with the old—and partly because (quite unreasonably, I consider) he is standing on his dignity and assuming the attitude that if the Spaniards want anything they should go to him officially. For myself, I have told Mr. Blake that I shall attend this meeting should it, indeed, materialise. I should not commit myself to anything, and it would, at any rate, be a gesture of goodwill towards the Spaniards and a sign that we might be willing, if it were possible, to assist them. On the other hand, I am fully aware that their intention may be to endeavour to enmesh us in their present difficulties, and I shall be on my guard against any such possibility. It would be fatal if the Spaniards, having made such a failure of their Administration here, should turn the spotlight on to us and bring the Moors to think that the administration of this zone was our responsibility as much as theirs. At present the natives fully realise that Spain has failed here, and there is, in consequence, immense bitterness on their part against the local Spanish régime.

4. Political relations between the British and Spanish colonies here are becoming more bitter on each side. The British, for their part, have evidently been hoping (without any foundation for such expectation) that I would return here with new instructions from you to adopt a more "positive" attitude towards our temporary Spanish masters. There are many disturbing elements in the colony who complain, much too audibly, I fear, against the present Spanish policy of His Majesty's Government, and who will not, in their ignorance, listen to reason. The Spaniards, on their part, there is no doubt, have been influenced by the Russian set-backs, and, although I find the officials as courteous as ever, there

seems no doubt that, as things are at present, they mean to see to it that every possible step is taken to whittle away the privileges to which we have a right under the Anglo-Spanish Agreement of the 1st January, 1941.

5. I would mention a measure, extremely small in itself, but which has caused immense irritation to our nationals here—I refer to the subject of my telegram No. 933 of the 19th October, regarding the regulation preventing the circulation of motor cars during week-ends. This regulation will fall especially heavily upon the British colony, a great number of whom reside in the country districts and whose chief marketing day is Sunday morning, when they are accustomed to come to Tangier by car to satisfy their household needs. The measure is furthermore quite absurd, as petrol has for months been severely rationed and there is, therefore, no object for such a regulation, which has, I believe, only been introduced into countries like Portugal where no rationing of petrol exists. Even in Portugal this measure has now been waived. As I stated in my telegram above referred to, I do not believe that I can claim exemption for British subjects from the regulation, but I intend to endeavour to enlist the Interventor's help with a view to securing a maximum number of special permits which will enable British subjects to use their cars during the prohibited period.

6. Finally, I would sum up by saying that whereas the more reasonable elements in the British colony realise that the war must bring privations and misery to the peoples of almost all the countries in the world, they do resent the unnecessary restrictions and pinpricks which are being inflicted upon all in Tangier at the present moment, not primarily because of the world war, but by reason of the inefficiency and graft exercised by the Spanish Administration. It is, indeed, true that wherever Spain goes she bears misery and famine in her train. She has certainly done so here, and since June 1940 (when the Spanish military first occupied Tangier) there has been a steady and progressive decline, ending with a landslide in September and October, until to-day the Spaniards will, unless they are really made to understand the seriousness of the situation, find themselves in a position from which it will be difficult to emerge. If they give me any loophole to assist them unofficially and without involving His Majesty's Government, I shall certainly do all that lies in my power to help, but it is difficult to see what can be done unless the present Spanish Administration is remodelled on more efficient and more moral lines.

7. Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon and to his Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-chief, Gibraltar.

I have, &c.
A. GASCOIGNE.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have been able to discuss the subject of paragraph 5 with the "Interventor." He assures me that persons residing in the country districts of this zone will be permitted to use their motor cars on Sunday mornings for legitimate business purposes, but he cannot furnish me with any sensible reason for the introduction of the order.

A. G.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Memorandum.

"SPAIN has a reputation for bringing misery, disorder and famine in her train . . . ." and the economic situation in Tangier after nearly a year of Spanish maladministration goes far to justify this reputation. The speed of her "Harlot's Progress" is best illustrated by the enormous percentage increases in the prices of staple food-stuffs since July 1940 or shortly after the Spanish military occupation of Tangier, viz. :—

	Per cent.		*Per cent.*
Sugar	250	Potatoes	180
Petrol	280	Other vegetables ...	200
Beans	220	Tinned foods ...	300
Coffee	420	Macaroni	500
Butter	500		
Meat	300	Average	365

2. Until the end of August last, however, it had been possible, in spite of the rising prices, to obtain adequate supplies of food without undue difficulty, but in the last six weeks there has been a grave deterioration in the food situation accompanied by very considerable weakening of the Moroccan franc and the peseta. Potatoes, sugar, rice and flour have been practically unobtainable, and fish and eggs only at exorbitant prices. Food queues, recently a feature of Tangier marketing, have become much more numerous.

3. There appear to be four reasons for this situation :—

(*a*) The incompetence and venality of the Spanish officials who allow speculators, no doubt for a consideration, to corner the Moors' essential foods, such as flour, sugar and green tea and force up the prices. As a result the Moors raise the prices of their eggs, chickens, &c., in order to buy their essentials, or else, in view of the futile Spanish attempts to impose price restrictions on them, refuse to bring their products to market and subsist on them themselves. This attitude is, it is suggested, similar to the Abyssinian reaction to totalitarian economics after the Italian conquest.

(*b*) The difficulty in obtaining supplies from the French Zone, which is one of Tangier's main sources of supply. The chief reason for this is probably the increasing economic stringency in French Morocco itself, both in the matter of food-stuffs and of the petrol necessary for their transport by lorry to Tangier. There are no grounds for believing that the Rabat authorities are endeavouring to exert political pressure by withholding supplies, and members of the local French Chamber of Commerce have recently informed a British merchant that their authorities intended, for political reasons, to continue to supply Tangier with flour.

(*c*) The withdrawal of food-stuffs by the military authorities from civil consumption. It has long been rumoured that the Spanish military authorities have been accumulating stocks of food-stuffs in the Spanish Zone with a view to defeating our blockade in time of war, and the reports of such hoarding have now been confirmed by the Spanish Consul himself, who informed His Majesty's Consul-General on the 15th October that goods arriving in Tangier from the French Zone or elsewhere "were being commandeered and wafted away to the Spanish Zone." It is reliably reported that the Army Supply Department at Tetuan have a six months' supply of each of the following commodities : flour, sugar, oil, chick-peas, or French beans.

(*d*) The refusal of the Tangier Customs to allow entire consignments to be cleared from the customs-house even on payment of duty. This is probably a manifestation of the policy mentioned in paragraph (*c*) above.

4. The principal sufferers from the food shortage are the Moors, who are voicing their discontent in no uncertain terms, and during this month of Ramadan there has been an unusually large number of burials in the Moorish cemetery adjoining this consulate-general. The only action which the Spanish authorities seem inclined to take to allay unrest is to refrain from prosecuting Moors for thefts from Europeans. Moslem populations are notoriously irritable in Ramadan and serious unrest might easily occur if no steps are taken to improve the position. Owing to the excellent effect of the recent British supplies of green tea, this food shortage will probably do much to counteract German propaganda, as the Moors will come to associate our cause with food supplies and that of Spain and her friend Germany with starvation. The disarming of the natives has, however, probably been too complete to permit of an effective rising which would distract Spain from European adventures and provide His Majesty's Government with grounds for landing troops and establishing a bridgehead in Northern Morocco.

October 20, 1941.

BASIL JUDD.

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